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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 14 WINTER 1987 NUMBER 4
WHERE THE WIND BLOWS: FEE SHIFTING IN
DOMESTIC RELATIONS CASES
WENONA Y. WHITFIELD*
Divorce and other domestic relations litigation has tradition-
ally been an exception to the American rule that each party, win
or lose, must pay his own attorney's fees. In this Article, Profes-
sor Whitfield examines the history of the American rule and the
derivation of the domestic relations exception. She then dis-
cusses judicial use of the American Bar Association's Discipli-
nary Rule 2-106(B) as a guideline for determining an appropri-
ate fee award. Her exploration reveals that the disciplinary rule
factors are often inappropriate in the domestic relations con-
text. The Article concludes with a suggestion for an alternative
method for determining fees.
U NDER the American rule each party in a civil lawsuit gener-
ally pays his own attorney's fee. However, courts have inher-
ent equitable power to award attorney's fees to an opposing party,
and all states and the District of Columbia have statutory provi-
sions' allowing attorney's fees to be awarded to an opponent in do-
* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University. B.A., 1970, Illinois Wesleyan
University; J.D., 1977, Southern Illinois University.
1. Alabama: ALA. CODE § 30-2-50 (1975); Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.140 (1983);
Arizona: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-324 (1956); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1210
(Michie Supp. 1985); California: CAL. FAM. LAW CODE § 4370 (West 1983); Colorado:
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-119 (1973); Connecticut: CoN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-62 (West
Supp. 1986); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1515 (1981); District of Columbia:
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911 (1981); Florida: FLA. STAT. § 61.16 (1985); Georgia: GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-6-1 (1980); Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 580-9 (1976); Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 32-
704 (1983); Illinois: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 16 (1975); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-
11.5-16 (Bums 1986); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.11 (West 1981) Kansas: KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-1610 (1985); Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.220 (1984); Louisiana: LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 159 (West 1982); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722 (1964); Mary-
land: MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-110 (1984); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 208, § 17 (West Supp. 1986); Michigan: MICH. Coup. LAWS § 552.13 (West Supp. 1985);
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.14 (West 1969); Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-
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mestic relations cases. 2 These statutes often are broadly worded
and empower a court to order either party' to pay a sum necessary
23 (1972); Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.355 (Vernon 1970); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-4-110 (1985); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-367 (1984); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. §
125.040 (1986); New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458.19 (1983); New Jersey:
N.J. CT. C.P.R. 4:42-9 (1986); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (1983); New York:
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 237 (Consol. Supp. 1985); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.4
(1984); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-23 (1981); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3105.18 (1980); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 176 (West 1981); Oregon: OR. REV.
STAT. § 107.445 (1983); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 502 (Purdon 1985); Rhode
Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (1981); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-120 (Law.
Co-op. 1976); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-17-7 (1984); Tennessee:
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-122 (1984); Texas: TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(c)(4) (Vernon
Supp. 1986); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3 (1984); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§
594(a), 606-07 (Supp. 1986); Virginia: VA CODE § 20-103 (1983); Washington: WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.09.140 (1986); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 48-2-13 (1986); Wisconsin:
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.23(1)(d) (West 1981); Wyoming: WYo. STAT. § 20-2-111 (1977).
In many of these statutory schemes, counsel fees are allowed for modification of a prior
decree, child support, paternity, legal separation, and annulment, in addition to divorce or
dissolution of marriage. E.g., Illinois: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 1 508(a) (1985); Indiana: IND.
CODE § 31-1-11.5-16 (Burns 1986); Wisconsin: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.23(1)(d) (West 1981).
2. The term "domestic relations" refers to actions for dissolution of marriage, legal sepa-
ration, separate maintenance, annulment, paternity, or actions for the collection of past due
child support or alimony. Unless otherwise indicated, the cases cited concern attorney's fee
awards granted in an action for divorce or dissolution of marriage.
3. In the vast majority of domestic relations cases, the husband is ordered to pay the
attorney's fees for the wife. Historically, an attorney's fee award was available only to the
wife unless suit money was expressly provided for the husband by statute. 1 W. NELSON,
NELSON ON DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 12.08 (2d ed. 1945); 3 W. NELSON, NELSON ON Di-
VORCE AND ANNULMENT § 29.05 (2d ed. 1945). Most statutes have now been amended to
include gender neutral language. But see Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208,
§ 17 (West Supp. 1986); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-367 (1984).
In what appears to be a growing number of cases, courts have ordered the wife to pay
attorney's fees on behalf of her husband. In Head v. Head, 505 A.2d 868 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1986), the appellate court affirmed an order requiring the wife to pay her husband's
attorney's fees resulting from her challenge of their previously agreed-upon property settle-
ment. However, the matter was remanded to the trial court because the fees awarded were
held to be excessive. See also Payne v. White, 614 S.W.2d 684 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981) (mother
ordered to pay $3500 toward father's attorney's fees, including an amount for out-of-state
counsel, where mother was found to have willfully violated custody order); Keister v.
Keister, 458 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (wife ordered to pay $56,970 to husband's attor-
neys in dissolution action), petition for review denied, 466 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1985); McVey v.
McVey, 417 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (wife ordered to pay $750 toward husband's
attorney's fees where husband's business provided little or no income and wife had annual
income of $17,000); Werk v. Werk, 416 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (order for wife to pay
$10,000 in fees to husband's attorney affirmed where husband had been excluded from the
business and home owned by the wife so that he was without income or support); Pfohl v.
Pfohl, 345 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (wife ordered to pay $30,000 for husband's attor-
ney's fees in dissolution action where wife had over $4 million in assets compared to hus-
band's $200,000); Hawblitzel v. Hawblitzel, 447 N.E.2d 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (wife or-
dered to pay $10,288.20 attorney's fees and costs to husband's attorney in dissolution action
because of wife's obstreperousness during pretrial proceedings); Peters v. Peters, 46 P.2d
19871 FEE SHIFTING
to enable the opposing party to maintain or defend the suit. His-
torically, in domestic relations litigation, the husband4 was ordered
to pay the wife's attorney's fees based on his duty to support her.5
Today, however, such an order depends on the parties' circum-
stances. At least in theory, a husband will be ordered to pay his
spouse's attorney's fees only after the court determines that he is
able to pay and she is not.'
After determining that one spouse is liable for the other's attor-
ney's fees, the amount must be assessed. Most statutory provisions
authorizing an award of attorney's fees in domestic relations cases
offer no guidance in setting a "reasonable" fee,7 and thus the fee is
within the court's discretion.8 Not surprisingly, fee awards have
evoked bitter disputes,9 with litigants characterizing the fees as ei-
487 (Okla. 1935) (wife who owned separate property ordered to pay reasonable expenses
incurred by the husband in defending divorce action, although the husband was found at
fault).
4. The legal status of the litigants in most of the cases discussed in this Article is actu-
ally former husband or former wife. For convenience, the terms "husband" and "wife" will
be used where the parties were legally married.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 54-77.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 78-90.
7. See, e.g., the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which provides:
The court from time to time after considering the financial resources of both par-
ties may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party
of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this Act and for attorney's fees,
including sums for legal services rendered and costs incurred prior to the com-
mencement of the proceeding or after entry of judgment. The court may order
that the amount be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in his
name.
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act has been adopted in Arizona, Colorado, Illinois,
Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, and Washington. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
ACT § 313, 9A U.L.A. 177 (1979).
A New Jersey court rule provides that a request for an attorney's fee award must be
supported by an affidavit which includes reference to 10 specific factors supporting the
amount sought. Many of the factors in the New Jersey rule are similar to those listed in the
American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule
(DR) 2-106(B), and include: (1) the nature of the services rendered; (2) the amount of the
estate or fund; (3) the responsibility assumed; (4) the results obtained; (5) the amount of
time spent by the attorney; (6) any particular novelty or difficulty; (7) the time spent and
services rendered by paralegals; (8) other factors pertinent in the evaluation of the services
rendered; (9) the amount of allowance applied for; and (10) an itemization of disbursements.
N.J. CT. CIv. PROC. R. 4:42-9 (1986).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 101-07.
9. See, e.g., Chaachou v. Chaachou, 135 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1961); Sharp v. Sharp, 491
S.W.2d 639 (Ky. 1973), appeal after remand, 516 S.W.2d 875 (Ky. 1974); Head v. Head, 505
A.2d 868 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986). Referring to appeals involving attorney's fee awards
under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), one
Justice has characterized such matters as "what must be one of the least socially productive
types of litigation imaginable: appeals from awards of attorney's fees, after the merits of a
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ther excessive or inadequate. At least one commentator has sug-
gested that fee awards are uniformly inadequate. 0 Often the fee
award is the only issue raised on appeal" and may generate more
time-consuming litigation than the underlying dispute. 2 In deter-
mining or evaluating an attorney's fee award in domestic relations
disputes, courts have considered a wide range of factors, most of
which are embodied in the American Bar Association's Code of
Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 2-106(B). "
Disciplinary Rule 2-106(B) provides:
A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a law-
yer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm
conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to
be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee
include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of
the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal
service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance
of the particular employment will preclude other employment by
the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the
circumstances.
case have been concluded." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 442 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
10. Spellman, How Should the Adequacy of Compensation For the Wife's Attorney in
Divorce Cases be Determined?, 4 FAM. L.Q. 53 (1970).
11. E.g., Florida: Guthrie v. Guthrie, 357 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Lyle v. Lyle,
167 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 472 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1964); Snider v. Snider, 375
So. 2d 591 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), appeal dismissed, 385 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 1980); Valparaiso
Bank & Trust Co. v. Sims, 343 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 678 (Fla.
1977); Illinois: Donelson v. Cowling, 471 N.E.2d 654 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (child support); In
re Marriage of Jacobson, 411 N.E.2d 947 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Iowa: In re Marriage of
Jayne, 200 N.W.2d 532 (Iowa 1972); Maryland: Head v. Head, 505 A.2d 868 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1986) (property settlement); New Jersey: Mayer v. Mayer, 434 A.2d 614 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1981); New York: Pelle v. Pelle, 428 N.Y.S.2d 602 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980);
Barnes v. Barnes, 389 N.Y.S.2d 112 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); North Carolina: Davis v. Tay-
lor, 344 S.E.2d 19 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (paternity action); Ohio: Swanson v. Swanson, 355
N.E.2d 894 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976); Texas: Mills v. Mills, 559 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977); Wisconsin: Hennen v. Hennen, 193 N.W.2d 717 (Wis. 1972).
12. The criticism that fee litigation can be more time-consuming than the underlying
litigation has been made regarding public interest litigation. See Berger, Court Awarded
Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 281, 292 & n.57 (1977).
13. MODEL CODE OF PROPESSIONAL RESPONsmnmrry DR 2-106(B) (1980).
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(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with
the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or law-
yers performing the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
The components listed in DR 2-106(B) have been cited in a variety
of federal and state cases in which fees were awarded to the pre-
vailing party, often pursuant to statutory authority. Such litigation
has included antitrust," civil rights,'5 deceptive trade practices, 6
eminent domain, 17 insurance,' 8 labor relations,' 9 landlord-tenant,
20
mechanics lien,2 ' and worker's compensation,2 2 as well as domestic
relations cases.
Courts often automatically invoke the considerations listed in
DR 2-106(B) and fail to discuss how the facts of the case may or
may not justify the fee awarded.2 8 Typical in this respect is Mitch-
ell v. Mitchell,2 4 a routine divorce case in which the trial judge
14. E.g., Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 426 F. Supp. 1156 (D. Md.), vacated
on other grounds, 556 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1977).
15. E.g., Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 453 U.S. 950
(1981); Walston v. School Bd., 566 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Georgia Highway
Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); Henderson v. District of Columbia, 493 A.2d 982
(D.C. 1985).
16. E.g., Marchion Terrazzo, Inc. v. Altman, 372 So. 2d 512 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
17. E.g., Dade County v. Oolite Rock Co., 348 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), cert. de-
nied, 358 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1978).
18. E.g., Drop Anchor Realty Trust v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 496 A.2d 339 (N.H. 1985);
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pitrolo, 342 S.E.2d 156 (W. Va. 1986).
19. E.g., Hartman v. Freedman, 591 P.2d 1318 (Col. 1979).
20. E.g., Mike v. Tharp, 583 P.2d 654 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
21. E.g., Drost v. Professional Bldg. Serv. Corp., 375 N.E.2d 241 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
22. E.g., Wise Mechanical Contractors v. Bignell, 718 P.2d 971 (Alaska 1986); Digiacomo
v. Board of Pub. Educ., 507 A.2d 542 (Del. 1986).
23. E.g., District of Columbia: Ritz v. Ritz, 197 A.2d 155 (D.C. 1964); Florida: Melt-
zer v. Meltzer, 400 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Adams v. Adams, 376 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1979), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1980); Massachusetts: Gould v. Gould, 267
N.E.2d 652 (Mass. 1971); Nebraska: Guggenmos v. Guggenmos, 359 N.W.2d 87 (Neb.
1984); Campbell v. Campbell, 276 N.W.2d 220 (Neb. 1979); Fotinos v. Fotinos, 168 N.W.2d
698 (Neb. 1969); New York: Pelle v. Pelle, 428 N.Y.S.2d 602 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1980); Reisch
v. Reisch, 379 N.Y.S.2d 275 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1975); Oklahoma: McElreath v. McElreath,
317 P.2d 225 (Okla. 1957); Oregon: Colbath & Colbath, 516 P.2d 763 (Or. Ct. App. 1973);
South Carolina: Mitchell v. Mitchell, 320 S.E.2d 706 (S.C. 1984); Ivey v. Ivey, 334 S.E.2d
123 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985); Gibson v. Gibson, 322 S.E.2d 680 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984); Texas:
Berg v. Berg, 232 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
The relevant factors applied by various courts are far from uniform. Compare Finley v.
Finley, 422 N.E.2d 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981), with Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 453 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1946).
24. 320 S.E.2d 706 (S.C. 1984).
816 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:811
granted the divorce, gave the wife custody of the minor children,
and divided the marital property. On the issue of attorney's fees
the trial court ordered the parties to pay their own fees. In revers-
ing, the South Carolina Supreme Court listed various "factors to
be considered" in awarding attorney's fees, including the nature of
the services performed, time spent on the case, and the results
achieved. The court also stated that the respective financial condi-
tions of the parties should be considered, finally holding that the
"[w]ife's request for $750.00 attorney's fees [was] reasonable. '25
It is impossible to tell from the court's mere recitation of the
listed factors which, if any, the court viewed as significant. Where
there is no indication that anything other than a routine level of
services was rendered, a simple restatement of DR 2-106(B) gives
little direction to the trial court and leads to inevitable inconsis-
tencies in the amount awarded for similar services.
In fact, the DR 2-106(B) elements listed as guides for determin-
ing the reasonableness of fees were apparently intended for evalu-
ating or settling fee disputes between attorney and client and not
for determining reasonable fees to be assessed against an adver-
sary." There is some question whether the factors are useful even
for their intended purpose. As one author has suggested: "Any
eight-factor formula produces a wide range of outcomes, particu-
larly if some of the factors are indeterminate like those in the
Code [.]"27
25. Id. at 710 (citations omitted).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 91-93.
27. G. HAZARD JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 97 (1978). Professor Hazard further
notes that,
[l]egally, the ethical rules proscribing excessive fees are redundant. The law at
large fully covers the matter. A contract for a fee is, under general principles of
law, a contract between a fiduciary and his protected dependent. As such, it is
unenforcable [sic] unless its terms are fair to the client. Hence, the rules in the
Code go no further than the law of contract and probably stop short of it. So
much for the rules.
Id. at 99. In contrast, some earlier writers and courts had expressed satisfaction with the
factors listed in Canon 12 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, the predecessor to DR 2-
106(B). A 1940 article contains the following assessment of the Canon 12 factors:
The problem of what constitutes "reasonable" expenses is not a new one .... [I]n
suits by attorneys against their clients, the courts have faced this problem fre-
quently, and have defined with some clarity the factors involved in calculating a
reasonable attorney's fee. Rule 12 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the
American Bar Association mentions a number of factors. . . Of course, the rule is
necessarily elastic, and its application requires the sound discretion of the judge.
But the task has not been highly complicated and in general the results have not
aroused serious opposition.
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Apart from their questionable utility in adjudicating a dispute
between a client and his attorney, the DR 2-106(B) factors are, to a
large extent, repetitive.2 8 In a leading attorney's fee case, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted that
"counsel who possess or who are reputed to possess more experi-
ence, knowledge and legal talent generally command hourly rates
superior to those who are less endowed. Thus, the quality of an
attorney's work in general is a component of the reasonable hourly
rate . "...29 Similarly, an assessment of the novelty and difficulty
of the questions involved will normally implicate the same consid-
erations as the time and labor needed and the time limitations im-
posed by the client or by the circumstances. However, because
courts continue to treat the DR 2-106(B) guidelines as indepen-
dent, discrete considerations the discussion in this Article parallels
that approach.
In this Article the author examines the propriety of an attor-
ney's fee award in light of the recent trend toward "no fault" con-
cepts in dissolution of marriage and other domestic relations litiga-
tion. The applicability of using DR 2-106(B) factors in determining
the amount of fees assessed against the "losing" 0 party in such
cases is questioned .8 The author also surveys the development of
Comment, Distribution of Legal Expense Among Litigants, 49 YALE L.J. 699, 711 (1940)
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); see also In re Osofsky, 50 F.2d 925, 927 (S.D.N.Y.
1931); Carson, Attorney's Fees in Divorce, 4 MIAMI L.Q. 22 (1949).
28. Commenting on the use of the guidelines contained in DR 2-106(B) to determine fee
awards in public interest litigation, the Supreme Court recently noted that "the 'novelty
[and] complexity of the issues,' 'the special skill and experience of counsel,' the 'quality of
representation,' and the 'results obtained' from the litigation are presumably fully reflected
in the [number of hours spent], and thus cannot serve as independent bases for increasing
the basic fee award." Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 106
S. Ct. 3088, 3098 (1986) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-900 (1984)). Accord
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 n.9 (1982) ("Many of [the factors listed in DR 2-
106(B)] usually are subsumed within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at
a reasonable hourly rate."); see also Recent Cases-Attorney and Client, 6 U. CHL L. REv.
484, 485 (1939).
29. Lindy Bros. Builders v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102,
117 (3d Cir. 1976) (emphasis in original). But see Finley v. Finley, 422 N.E.2d 289, 293 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1981) ("Although the number of hours expended may give an indication of the
complexity of the issues it can not definitively reflect the nature and quality of work pro-
vided during that time.").
30. Even when a spouse is the "winning party" on all substantive issues in dispute,
courts have assessed attorney's fees against that party. See Ritz v. Ritz, 197 A.2d 155 (D.C.
1964); Apkarian v. Apkarian, 331 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972).
31. This author does not address the use of the DR 2-106(B) factors in resolving fee
disputes between a domestic relations client and his attorney. E.g., Illinois: In re Marriage
of Pitulla, 491 N.E.2d 90 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); South Carolina: Elliott v. Green, 263 S.E.2d
650 (S.C. 1980); South Dakota: Stanton v. Saks, 311 N.W.2d 584 (S.D. 1981). There is also
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attorney's fees assessments in civil litigation generally and explores
why, historically, wives were almost always awarded attorney's fees
in actions for divorce or dissolution of marriage and other domestic
relations cases. The increasing use of DR 2-106(B) factors to deter-
mine reasonable fee awards is examined, and the confusing manner
in which courts have applied these factors in domestic relations
disputes is analyzed. Because courts have often identified "the
amount involved and the results obtained" as the key factors in
awarding attorney's fees, these factors are examined to ascertain
whether their use is legitimate in light of the proscription of con-
tingency fees in domestic relations cases. The author concludes by
suggesting a more equitable means to determine an appropriate
award of attorney's fees against opposing parties in domestic rela-
tions disputes.
I. HISTORIcAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ASSESSMENT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES
Fee awards to a spouse's attorney may be explored within the
history of domestic relations litigation. These awards should also
be examined in light of allocation of litigation costs in general.
A. The English vs. the American Rule
Two basic rules govern the assessment of attorney's fees against
an opposing party in a civil action. The English rule, which allows
an attorney's fee to be awarded to the prevailing party,32 is fol-
lowed in all major common law nations except the United States."3
In contrast, American jurisdictions follow the American rule, under
which each party to a civil action is responsible for his own attor-
no discussion of attorney disciplinary actions where the attorney was accused of charging an
excessive fee in a domestic relations matter. E.g., Indiana: In re Lockyear, 305 N.E.2d 440
(Ind. 1974); Maryland: Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kerpelman, 438 A.2d 501 (Md.
1981); Wisconsin: In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Kinast, 357 N.W.2d 282 (Wis.
1984).
32. For a concise history of the English rule, see Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 851-
54 (1929). As the author points out, "costs" under the English system, include all expenses
of litigation which a party must pay to an opposing party. Fees in the English system are
paid by a litigant to the officers of the court.
33. Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301, 311
& n.31 (1973). The author notes that the English practice of awarding fees had been estab-
lished long before the first American colonies. The English practice dates back at least to
1275 with the Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, ch. 1, which allowed attorney's fee awards to
prevailing plaintiffs. Id. at 312.
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ney's fees.3 4 Legal historians generally agree that colonial American
courts initially adopted the English rule.3 5 For example, a 1745
Virginia law provided that "in county court actions there should be
taxed as costs an attorney's fee of 'fifteen shillings or one hundred
and fifty pounds of tobacco.' "36 As our judicial system developed,
the English rule was gradually abandoned and "the idea that fees
should not be taxed as costs to the losing party became firmly im-
bedded in our tradition. 3 7
No less than five theories have been advanced to account for the
early American courts' uniform rejection of the English rule. One
theory holds that Americans considered an attorney's services
something of a luxury:
[A]t the time our judicial system was established there was a wish
to maintain a system of laws and procedures in which every man
would be able to represent himself adequately before the courts.
The idea that the successful litigant would be reimbursed for the
expense of his attorney would appear improper as the litigant
himself should have been able to succeed without this unneces-
sary assistance. As the courts at the time discovered law rather
than made it, it also appears that the court would have discov-
ered the proper result without the assistance of the litigant's at-
torney. Consequently, if the litigant would have received the same
treatment without an attorney, the loser should not be put to this
unnecessary expense. If attorneys are considered a luxury, rather
than a necessity, one who wished to utilize their services should
not be compensated for this indiscretion."
34. See generally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 249-50
(1975) (noting that the American rule was first adopted in Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 306 (1796)); 1 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATroRNEv FEEs, V 1.02 (1985).
35. See Comment, supra note 27, at 700-01; Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the
Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1216, 1218 & n.12 (1967).
36. McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Dam-
ages, 15 MINN. L. REV. 619, 620 (1931) (quoting Virginia Laws Feb. 1745, ch. 6, § 15, 5
Henning, Stat. at L. 344).
37. Note, supra note 35, at 1219.
38. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not A Cost of Litigation?, 49 IowA L. REv. 75, 81
(1963). See also Note, supra note 35, at 1220 for a discussion of the effect of the early
pioneer spirit on our judicial system:
[Ilt is [the] early philosophy of intense individualism which, it is submitted,
underlies the development of the American rule and the subsequent rejection of
the English rule on fees. In our early days, the pioneer's very existence depended
upon his individual ability to cope with the particular situation at hand. It was
only natural that when legal disputes arose, he relied upon himself to achieve jus-
tice inside the courtroom, or outside it, rather than upon those 'characters of dis-
repute' who demanded payment for their services.
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Further support for this theory is provided by the fact that most
early American judges were laymen without previous legal training
or experience. The law was considered "a body of rules any intelli-
gent man could understand," making the employment of lawyers
unnecessary.39
A second theory advanced to explain the development of the
American rule was that as litigation was often uncertain, the En-
glish system was perceived as unjustly deterring the poor from
bringing possibly meritorious actions because "if. . . unsuccessful
they [would] have to pay their opponent's counsel, as well as for
their own."' 0 Ironically, the third theory offered for the develop-
ment of the American rule is that early American courts believed
"the time, expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating
* . * reasonable attorney's fees would pose substantial burdens for
judicial administration.""' The Supreme Court observed in Oel-
richs v. Spain,'2 that attorneys' fees vary, as does the client's will-
ingness to pay. Furthermore, if both the attorney and client know
that fees will be paid by the adversary, abuses would be possible.
Courts would then be called upon to mediate fee disputes, possibly
putting the issue to a jury, producing litigation "more animated
and protracted than that in the original cause.' 3
A fourth theory propounded by some early American courts was
that attorney's fees were entirely too remote from, and not directly
caused by, the defendant's wrongful conduct." An early Connecti-
39. Goodhart, supra note 32, at 873.
40. Nussbaum, supra note 33, at 313. Accord Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). The view that the American rule favored the poor as
well as the wealthy litigant has been criticized by Goodhart:
[T]his view is due to a confusion between costs and fees. It is obvious that if the
court fees are large, then a plaintiff, who cannot afford to pay them, will necessa-
rily be prevented from seeking the assistance of the law, for the fees must be paid
before the action is commenced. But as the losing party does not have to pay the
costs until after the action has been determined he is not thereby precluded from
prosecuting his claim. Experience in England has shown that it is the wealthy
defendant who suffers under this system for if he loses he will have to pay the
plaintiff's costs, while if he wins he will not be able to collect his own from the
unsuccessful and impecunious adversary. It is only where the law requires that a
plaintiff, before commencing an action, shall give security for costs that the poor
man is at a disadvantage.
Goodhart, supra note 32, at 874-75 (footnote omitted).
41. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967).
42. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211 (1872).
43. Id. at 231.
44. Stickney v. Goward, 201 N.W. 630 (Minn. 1925); McLaughlin, The Recovery of At-
torney's Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 761, 780-81
(1972).
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cut appellate court criticized a jury charge which had implied that
attorney's fees were recoverable as actual damages "if the plaintiffs
had been compelled to come into court to vindicate their rights.""5
The court found this was error as there would be no way to effec-
tively limit such a broad interpretation of actual damages.'8
A final explanatory theory of the development of the American
rule posits that it was purely accidental. According to Professor
Ehrenzweig, the rule is not derived from a deep-rooted American
common law principle or frontier attitude.
[W]hat is now so often represented as a noble postulate for re-
straint of the winner in a chance contest, is actually due to the
simple fact that the New York legislature in 1848, in attempting
to perpetuate what it considered a sound legal rule of recovery of
attorneys' fees by the prevailing party, made the fatal mistake of
fixing the amount recoverable in dollars and cents rather than in
percentages of the amount recovered or claimed. It was this mis-
take probably that caused lawyers and courts, when rising costs
began to obscure the real purpose of the statutory amounts of
"costs," gradually to forget the meaning of those amounts. And it
was this process of gradual forgetting rather than a deep-seated
moral argument that has apparently caused the abolition of the
prevailing party's right to the recovery of his counsel fees.47
Though the American rule has been widely criticized in recent
years,'5 it was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court as recently as
1975.' The practical effect of the rule has been diminished how-
ever through statutory exceptions that allow attorney's fees in a
variety of federal5" and state"1 claims. Moreover, federal and state
45. St. Peter's Church v. Beach, 26 Conn. 354 (1857).
46. Id. at 364. See also Stickney v. Goward, 201 N.W. 630 (Minn. 1925) and cases cited
therein.
47. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L.
REv. 792, 798-99 (1966).
48. See, e.g., id.; Kuenzel, supra note 38; McLaughlin, supra note 44; Posner, An Eco-
nomic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399
(1973); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L.
Rzv. 202 (1966).
49. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
50. Today, more than 120 federal statutes allow a court to award counsel fees. See, e.g.,
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982); Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(k) (1982); Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §
3612(c) (1982); Noise Control Act of 1972, § 12(d), 42 U.S.C. § 4911(d) (1982); Securities Act
of 1933, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)
(1982); Unfair Competition Act, 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1982); see also Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct.
3012, 3036 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting (Appendix)).
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courts have historically recognized the "common fund," "common
benefit," and "bad faith" exceptions to the American rule. In Aly-
eska Pipeline Service v. Wilderness Society,62 the Supreme Court
provided a capsule sketch of these exceptions. Courts have histori-
cally possessed equitable powers to permit recovery of costs and
attorney's fees for those parties who preserve funds which also
benefit others. Also, attorney's fees traditionally could be assessed
based on "'willful disobedience of the court order'. . . or when the
losing party had 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons.' "5s
Although the award of attorney's fees in domestic relations liti-
gation generally cannot be justified by these equitable theories, an
award of attorney's fees for the wife in domestic relations cases has
been one of the historically accepted exceptions to the American
rule. This may be due to explicit statutory provisions or as a result
of the exercise of the court's inherent equitable power.
51. See, e.g., Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-327 (West Supp. 1986) (worker's
compensation); Florida: FLA. STAT. § 400.023 (Supp. 1986) (nursing home residents' rights);
id. § 681.108 (motor vehicle warranty claims); Illinois: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1211/2, 270a
(1985) (consumer fraud and deceptive business practices); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110/2, 1 la-10
(1985) (guardians and disabled adults); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, 1 7-111, 7-123 (1985) (emi-
nent domain); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, 1014.1(b)(1985) (contesting validity of administra-
tive rules); Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-359 (1984) (actions against insurance compa-
nies); Texas: TEx. Bus. &. COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01(e) (Vernon Supp. 1985) (fraud in real
estate and stock transactions); see also 2 S. SPEISER, ArrORNEYS' FEES §§ 14.70- .202 (1973);
Stoebuck, supra note 48, at 209-10.
52. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
53. Id. at 257-59 (quoting Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-38
(1923) and F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indust. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974)). For a thorough discussion of the development of the court's equity powers in this
area, see Berger, supra note 12, at 295-303; 1 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, supra note 34,
1.01-4.07.
State courts have also exercised their equitable powers to award attorney's fees to the
prevailing party under similar theories. See, e.g., Alabama: Strang v. Taylor, 2 So. 760
(Ala. 1887); Alaska: Thomas V. Croft, 614 P.2d 795 (Alaska 1980); California: Berger v.
Godden, 210 Cal. Rptr. 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Brandt v. Superior Court (Standard Ins.
Co.), 693 P.2d 796 (Cal. 1985) (en banc); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert.
denied sub nom. 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Colorado: Certified Realty Corp. v. Smith, 597 P.2d
1043 (Colo. 1979) (en banc); Illinois: Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 360 N.E.2d 386 (Ill. App. Ct.
1977); Missouri: In re Estate of Murray, 682 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); New
Hampshire: Archer V. Dow, 489 A.2d 574 (N.H. 1985); Oklahoma: Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc. v. Roberts, 719 P.2d 470 (Okla. Ct. App. 1985); West Virginia: Weigand v.
Alliance Supply Co., 28 S.E. 803 (W. Va. 1897).
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B. The Evolution of the American Rule Exception for
Attorney's Fee Awards in Domestic Relations Matters
The husband historically has been liable for the wife's attorney's
fees in actions for divorce or legal separation."' The early common
law recognized two types of fees for the wife's counsel. Fees that
were provided during the pendency of the matrimonial action,
often referred to as "suit money, '55 were to "insure to the wife an
efficient preparation of her case, and a fair and impartial trial
thereof."56 "Attorney's fees," on the other hand, was the term
given to fees paid to the wife's counsel by the husband as part of
the final order or decree concluding the litigation.5 7 By 1932,
thirty-nine states had statutes allowing the wife suit money or at-
torney's fees or both s.5  But even absent express statutory author-
ity, most jurisdictions recognized the inherent equity power of the
court to grant such fees.59 The traditional justification for obligat-
ing the husband to pay his wife's attorney's fees turns on the spe-
cial duty of the husband to provide support or necessaries.6 0 This
54. See generally 2 W. NELSON, NELSON ON DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 876 (1895); 2 S.
SPEISER, supra note 51, § 14.81; 3 FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE § 39.01 (A. Rutkin ed. 1985).
55. "Suit money" has been defined as:
money necessary to enable a spouse, generally the wife, to carry on or defend the
matrimonial action, i.e., the necessary expenses, relating to bringing and carrying
on, or defending the action . . . [and it] has been said to be broad enough to
include counsel fees and all expenses of the matrimonial action.
1 W. NELSON, supra note 3, § 12.04 (1985).
56. Id.
57. 3 W. NELSON, supra note 3, § 29.05. In many jurisdictions, it was important to ensure
that a claim for fees was included in the final decree or order because courts usually held
that a husband would not be liable in an independent action for attorney's fees for legal
services provided to the wife once the divorce was granted or the marital union was dis-
solved. See Case Comment, 21 ST. Louis L. REV. 89, 90 (1935); Note, Divorce-Liability of
Husband for Wife's Attorney's Fees, 28 VA. L. REV. 450, 451 (1932).
58. Note, Divorce-Liability of Husband For Wife's Attorney's Fees, 18 TEx. L. REV. 87,
87 (1939) (quoting 2 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 110 (1932)).
59. See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 69 Ill. 167 (1873); Petrie v. People, 40 Ill. 334 (1866),
Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 6 Mich. 285 (1859), Griffin v. Griffin, 47 N.Y. 134 (1872); see also 1
W. NELSON, supra note 3, § 12.05; II J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE §§ 396-98 (6th ed. 1881); Note, supra note 58, at 88.
60. The term "necessaries" had a unique meaning in early matrimonial law. One writer
offers the following explanation of the term:
It was said in the older books that 'Necessaries consist only of food, drink, cloth-
ing, washing, physic, instruction, and a suitable place of residence.' But such arbi-
trary schedules are less in favor with modern courts; and the usual modern rule is
to include whatever is necessary to her reasonable support, in view of the means of
the husband and the standard of living to which they have been accustomed. The
rule, however, still includes only necessaries, and not articles of mere luxury. Ap-
plying this general test to the particular cases which have come before the courts
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special duty61 was derived from the fact that the wife had no finan-
cial status apart from her husband.2 An award for the wife's attor-
ney was necessary in order to provide her with the financial means
to maintain or defend the action. The wife's "disability of cover-
ture" 5 meant that except in limited circumstances a married wo-
man could not convey land;64 execute valid contracts;6 purchase
on her own credit;s execute a will;67 or act as an executor, adminis-
trator, or legal guardian without her husband's consent.6 8 The
wife's disability of coverture arose because "the wife's legal exis-
tence was incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband,
under whose wing, protection, and cover she perform[ed] every-
thing."'69 The financial implications of this status were far-reach-
for decision, it has been held that medical services, artificial teeth, jewelry of a
kind suitable to the means of the family, the wages of servants, suitable furniture,
the rent of lodgings, a piano under special circumstances, were necessaries; while
diamonds, a pew in church, a set of Stoddard's Lectures, have been held not
necessaries.
. . . Legal services rendered to the wife are a necessary for which the husband
is liable to pay if the services were really necessary to the wife's defense against a
prosecution, or even in instituting legal proceedings when such proceedings were
necessary for her protection.
E. PECK, THE LAW OF PERSONS AND OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 79 (3d ed. 1930) (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis in original). See also J. SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE Do-
MESTIc RELATIONS § 61 (5th ed. 1895). But see W. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF PER-
SONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS §§ 70-71, at 135-36 (2d ed. 1909).
61. There was no corresponding duty on the wife to support her husband, "even if she is
wealthy and he is feeble and in need." J. SCHOULER, supra note 60, § 78 (footnote omitted).
62. See generally Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 835, 849 (1985).
63. See generally P. BINGHAM, THE LAW OF INFANCY AND COVERTURE 181-200 (1849); J.
LONG, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS §§ 132-35 (3d ed. 1923).
64. See M. SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 14 (1986); J.
LONG, supra note 63, § 140.
65. A married woman's contracts, except in a few instances, were void under the com-
mon law, because "she [was] presumed to act under the dominion of her husband, and
hence to have no independent will." J. LONG, supra note 63, § 134, at 215.
66. A wife could purchase as an agent of the husband when he had expressly given her
authority to act on his behalf, or when he had, through his acts, clothed her with apparent
authority. See W. TIFFANY, supra note 60, §§ 70-71.
67. Id. § 141.
68. See J. LONG, supra note 63, § 143.
69. J. SCHOULER, supra note 60, § 34, at 63 (emphasis added). Under the early common
law, the disability of coverture extended not only to the legal and financial rights of the wife
but also to control over her personhood. E. PECK, supra note 60, § 56, at 195, discusses the
husband's rights at early common law. These rights included chastisement and restraint of
the wife when appropriate, although "'the husband was prohibited from using any violence
to his wife ... otherwise than lawfully and reasonably belongs to the husband for the due
government and correction of his wife.'" (citation omitted). This right of restraint over the
wife
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ing. All of a wife's property was under her husband's control; he
could sell her stocks, slaves, clothing, or jewelry, and make all the
decisions concerning her lands as well as collect all rents and
profits.7
Given the disability of coverture and the corresponding inability
of the wife to control any significant71 assets received before or
during the marital union, the practical reasons for this exception to
the American rule are evident. Any other rule would have given
the attorney little hope of enforcing a claim for fees.
71
depends upon the proposition that the husband is dignior persona.. . . [He] must
answer to others for his wife's conduct .... Strong instances for the exercise of
this right occur where the wife has eloped with a libertine, and the husband
wishes to bring her home; or where she purposes an elopement, and he seeks to
prevent it; or perhaps, where she goes recklessly into lewd company.. . . So, too,
the husband, by virtue of his marital authority over his own household, might be
allowed,. . . to regulate her movements so as to prevent her from going to places,
associating with people, or engaging in pursuits, disapproved by himself on ra-
tional grounds.
Id. § 45, at 76-77.
70. M. SALMON, supra note 64, at 15.
71. Under the early common law, the wife was sometimes said to gain "title" to savings
out of her housekeeping allowance. J. SCHOULER, supra note 60, § 161. She was allowed a
limited interest in "pin money" and "paraphernalia." She also could maintain her property
apart from her husband during coverture by use of a trust creating the wife's equitable
separate estate. Id. §§ 116-17; see also P. BINGHAM, supra note 63, §§ 268-69.
72. This point was recognized by at least one early commentator:
Natural justice and the policy of the law alike demand, that, in any litigation
between husband and wife, they shall have equal facilities for presenting their
case before the tribunal. This requires that they shall have equal command of
funds. So that, if she is without means, the law having vested the acquisitions of
the two in him, he should be compelled to furnish them to her, to an extent
rendering her his equal in the suit. This doctrine is a part of the same whereon
proceeds temporary alimony.
II J. BISHOP, supra note 59, § 387 (emphasis added); see also Comment, Counsel Fees in
Matrimonial Actions, 38 NEB. L. REv. 761 (1959). In support of this view, one nineteenth
century jurist explained: " 'God knows, the condition of all women, but especially of married
women, is bad enough by the common law of England, and advancing civilization loudly
demands its amelioration. But that law, which almost enslaves the wife, makes the husband
liable for her support.'" Hindus & Withey, The Law of Husband and Wife in Nineteenth-
Century America: Changing Views of Divorce, in II WOMEN AND THE LAW 133, 143 (D. Weis-
berg ed. 1982) (quoting Prince v. Prince, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 282 (1845)).
Disparity in the economic resources of the parties may still provide a justification for
requiring husbands to pay their wives' attorney's fees. Statistically, women earn only 61% of
the wages earned by men. NATIONAL COMM. ON PAY EQUITY & NAT'L INST. FOR WOMEN OF
COLOR, WOMEN OF COLOR AND PAY EQUITY, reprinted in Women in the Workforce: Pay Eq-
uity: Hearings Before the Joint Economic Committee, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 190, 198 (1984).
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C. Determining When Attorney's Fees Should be
Awarded-The Common Law Approach
Under the common law, the husband's obligation to pay his
wife's attorney's fees in actions for divorce or legal separation was
upheld if three conditions were met. First, the wife had to be with-
out adequate funds to pay her counsel's fees from her own separate
estate.73 As a practical matter, given the wife's disability of cover-
ture, this condition seldom prohibited the wife from receiving suit
money or a permanent attorney's fee. Even if the wife had a lim-
ited separate estate, courts often noted that she was not required
to exhaust her capital in order to qualify for an attorney's fee
award.7 4 Second, courts conditioned such awards upon the hus-
band's having sufficient funds to pay the wife's attorney, noting
that as plaintiff, the husband could not defeat his wife's claim for
fees merely because he lacked funds. If the plaintiff-husband was
without sufficient means to pay his wife's counsel's fees, his only
recourse was to dismiss the action until he was financially able to
pay.75 Third, the wife could not be at fault in the dissolution of the
marriage or otherwise guilty of a marital offense.76 Similarly, an
award was not allowed where it appeared probable from the plead-
ings that the wife could not succeed."
D. Determining When Attorney's Fees Should Be
Awarded-The Modern Approach
Numerous decisions support the maxim that the party seeking
an award of attorney's fees must demonstrate financial inability to
pay and the spouse's ability to pay.7 8 Though the elements of fault,
adultery or other marital offenses are ostensibly no longer consid-
ered in the determination of spousal liability for fees,79 there are
73. II J. BISHOP, supra note 59, §§ 387, 394.
74. Miller v. Miller, 75 N.C. 70 (1876).
75. II J. BIsHoP, supra note 59, § 395. See also Mangels v. Mangels, 6 Mo. App. 481
(1879); Eliot v. Eliot, 46 N.W. 806 (Wis. 1890).
76. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, 17 Ind. 309 (1861); Quincy v. Quincy, 10 N.H. 272 (1839); see
also 1 W. NELSON, supra note 3, § 12.26; 3 W. NELSON, supra note 3, § 29.05; J. SCHOULER,
supra note 60, § 61; II J. BISHOP, supra note 59, § 405, at 351-52. But see Dougherty v.
Dougherty, 55 A.2d 787 (Md. 1947).
77. York v. York, 34 Iowa 530 (1872); Friend v. Friend, 27 N.W. 34 (Wis. 1886).
78. See In re Marriage of Dulyn, 411 N.E.2d 988 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); In re Marriage of
Jacobson, 411 N.E.2d 947 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
79. In In re Marriage of Stephenson, 209 Cal. Rptr. 383, 406 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (cita-
tion omitted), the court commented:
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many cases where relative blameworthiness or innocence of the
parties have been significant in the determination of the award.80
In a growing number of cases, courts appear to have abandoned
the early common law purpose of the attorney's fee award-to en-
sure that both parties have sufficient financial ability to maintain
or defend the matrimonial action- 8' and have instead awarded
fees based on which spouse is in the better financial posture. Mari-
tal dissolution proceedings may often leave both parties without
sizable liquid assets. Because one spouse may have more earning
potential than the other, attorney's fees for both are shifted to the
spouse with the greater earning potential. As a practical matter,
this type of fee shifting is treated as a supplemental property divi-
sion.8 2 Such a procedure may be justified where the relative earn-
ing potential of the parties is disparate.8 However, the policy must
be questioned when neither spouse is in a financially superior posi-
tion8 4 or when attorney's fees are awarded to a spouse who is able
to pay.
While the attorney's fees the wife incurs as a result of the husband's dilatory tac-
tics is an appropriate consideration in determining the amount of an award, it is
not sufficient to justify their award in the first instance. Such an award must be
based solely on the respective abilities of the parties to pay. . . . [Aln award of
attorney's fees based solely upon the recalcitrance of a party is in the nature of a
sanction.
See also Alabama: Rosser v. Rosser, 355 So. 2d 717 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977), cert. denied, 355
So. 2d 722 (Ala. 1978); Florida: Foreman v. Foreman, 40 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1949); Illinois:
Ganzer v. Ganzer, 249 N.E.2d 660 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969); Mississippi: Nix v. Nix, 176 So. 2d
297 (Miss. 1965); New York: Dickenson v. Dickenson, 81 N.Y.S.2d 294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1948); Wisconsin: Wendland v. Wendland, 138 N.W.2d 185 (Wis. 1965).
80. See Gibson v. Gibson, 322 S.E.2d 680, 684 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984), where the court
acknowledged that "the factor of fault on the wife's part could well determine how the is-
sues of alimony or separate maintenance, equitable distribution, and attorney's fees ought to
be decided" and remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of appropriate
facts. See also District of Columbia: Rachal v. Rachal, 489 A.2d 475 (D.C. 1985); Illi-
nois: Gasperini v. Gasperini, 373 N.E.2d 576 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); South Carolina: Miller
v. Miller, 313 S.E.2d 288 (S.C. 1984); Utah: Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984).
81. There are, of course, numerous cases which indicate that the court considered the
payment of an award to be a necessity because of the wife's nonexistent or relatively meager
income and nonliquid assets-principally the former marital home-after a distribution of
the marital assets. See Alabama: Isham v. Isham, 464 So. 2d 109 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985);
South Carolina: Collins v. Collins, 122 S.E.2d 1 (S.C. 1961); Utah: Beals v. Beals, 682
P.2d 862 (Utah 1984).
82. See In re Marriage of Craig, 567 P.2d 141 (Or. Ct. App. 1977); Fitzgerald v. Fitzger-
ald, 459 A.2d 498, 502 n.10 (Conn. 1983); Note, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees in Di-
vorce- "Necessities" or "Factors in Property Division'?, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 172 (1977).
83. See, e.g., G.S.G. v. P.S.G., 412 A.2d 319 (Del. 1980); Hano v. Hano, 367 N.E.2d 1190
(Mass. App. Ct. 1977).
84. See Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1976).
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A recent Indiana decision, Finley v. Finley,8 5 illustrates this con-
cern. The trial court divided the marital property, giving assets in-
cluding stocks and real estate valued at approximately $1.9 million
to the wife and assets valued at $3.5 million to the husband. Addi-
tionally, the court awarded the wife's attorneys a fee of $350,000.
The appellate court limited its fee discussion to whether the fee
was excessive, thus impliedly approving the fee award even though
the wife had been granted ample resources to pay her own counsel
fees. 6 In accord with this reasoning, an Illinois court commented
on the relationship between a substantial award of alimony and
attorney's fees: "[W]e reject [the husband's] assertion that the ali-
mony award itself provided ample funds to allow [the wife] to pay
her counsel. The alimony award was based on a set of criteria ex-
clusive of attorneys' fees and any effort to connect them is
misspent. '87
In response to decisions such as Finley, a proposal to eliminate
all attorney's fee awards might be seriously considered. It should
be noted, however, that few awards of alimony or divisions of mari-
tal property result in the wife's having access to a magnitude of
funds. According to a recent study of divorcing couples in Califor-
nia, divorced women with minor children experience a 73 % drop in
their standard of living, while their husbands experience a 42%
rise, during the first year after divorce.88 The study also indicates
that: the most valuable asset of most divorcing couples is the fam-
ily home which they own or are buying,89 only 24% of the divorc-
ing couples have a pension, only 11% have a business, and only
11% own other real estate which can be divided as marital prop-
erty.90 Assuming the accuracy of these findings, the elimination of
attorney's fee awards, requiring each party to be responsible for his
own fee, will further penalize women. Unless there is a more equi-
table distribution of the property-one which considers the higher
earning potential of the husband-fee awards must be continued,
85. 422 N.E.2d 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
86. Accord Adams v. Adams, 376 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Abel v. Abel, 289 P.2d
724 (Wash. 1955).
87. Bellow v. Bellow, 419 N.E.2d 924, 932 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
88. L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985).
89. Id. at xii.
90. Id. at 55. Weitzman also reports that a 1978 sampling of divorcing couples, most of
whom were California residents, revealed that "the median value of separate property
claimed by the husband was $10,000 [and] [t]he median value of separate property claimed
by the wife was $2,000." Id.
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particularly in cases where parties have little in the way of tangible
assets.
II. USING THE Code of Professional Responsibility GUIDELINES
TO DETERMINE A REASONABLE FEE IN DOMESTIC RELATIONS
DISPUTES
It is difficult to determine how the guidelines contained in DR 2-
106(B) came to be adopted in domestic relations cases. The ex-
plicit language of the various guidelines refers to clients, indicating
that the guidelines were meant to be considered in the context of
fee disputes arising between an attorney and client.9' This presents
a different situation from cases in which the court is called upon to
determine a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the opposing
party. In one promissory note dispute the plaintiffs were awarded
attorney's fees and the judge noted that DR 2-106(B) factors were
appropriate in evaluating a fee based on the client's wishes, but
were unrelated to the fair market value of the attorney's work. e2
"This is because DR 2-106(B) was designed to establish the mini-
mal conduct allowed an attorney regarding the legal fees that he
charges his client. Its factors were never intended as a guideline to
establish the reasonableness of an attorney fee award."' 3
A. Historical Development of the Code of Professional
Responsibility Guidelines for Determining a Reasonable
Attorney's Fee
The historical development of DR 2-106(B) guidelines does little
to explain how the factors came to be misapplied to situations in-
volving fee awards to an opposing party. The first code of profes-
sional ethics for lawyers, the Canons of Professional Ethics, was
adopted by the American Bar Association (ABA) in 1907.94 How-
ever, prior to 1907 state bar associations had promulgated ethics
91. Early writers on the subject of Canon 12 of the American Bar Association Code of
Legal Ethics (the predecessor to DR 2-106(B)) focused on the normal attorney-client rela-
tionship. See, e.g., Magruder, A Reasonable Fee, 19 GA. B.J. 201 (1956); Void, Ethics and
Economics in Lawyers' Fees, 8 MARQ. L. REV. 228 (1924); Note, Canons of Legal Ethics, 1
MAss. L.Q. 184 (1916).
92. Liebowitz v. Moore, 436 N.E.2d 899 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
93. Id. at 904 (Staton, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
94. Report of the Committee on Code of Professional Ethics, Thirty-First Annual Meet-
ing of the American Bar Association 61 (1908) [hereinafter cited as Comm. Report].
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codes, beginning with Alabama in 1887. 95 Additionally, several
other states, including Florida, had adopted statements, oaths, or
resolutions which delineated the "duties" of attorneys." Virtually
all of the state codes and the code adopted by the ABA were based
on Alabama's code of ethics.9 7
The original 1887 Alabama Code listed six elements to consider
in fixing fees:
1st. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to properly conduct the
cause. 2d. Whether the particular case will debar the attorney's
action, and in which there is a reasonable expectation that the
attorney would otherwise be employed; and herein of the loss of
other business while employed in the particular case, and the an-
tagonism with other clients growing out of the employment. 3d.
The customary charges of the Bar for similar services. 4th. The
real amount involved and the benefits resulting from the services.
5th. Whether the compensation be contingent or assured. 6th. Is
the client a regular one, retaining the attorney in all his business?
No one of these considerations is in itself controlling. They are
mere guides in ascertaining what the service was really worth; and
in fixing the amount it should never be forgotten that the profes-
sion is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere
money-getting trade.as
A comparison of the Alabama Code with Canon 12 as promul-
gated in the 1907 Canons of Professional Ethics9" and the lan-
95. Id. Georgia and Virginia adopted ethics codes in 1889, Michigan in 1897, Colorado in
1898, North Carolina in 1900, Wisconsin in 1901, West Virginia and Maryland in 1902, Ken-
tucky in 1903, and Missouri in 1906. Id.
96. Id.
97. The Alabama Code was apparently inspired by the writings of Judge Sharswood, a
local judge. See G. SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 1854 [reprinted and dis-
tributed by the American Bar Association in 1907]. For a complete history of the Alabama
Code, see Jones, Canons of Professional Ethics, Their Genesis and History, 2 ALA. LAW. 247
(1941).
98. Comm. Report, supra note 94, at 709 app. B.
99. Canon 12 as adopted provided:
In fixing fees, lawyers should avoid charges which overestimate their advice and
services, as well as those which undervalue them. A client's ability to pay cannot
justify a charge in excess of the value of the service, though his poverty may re-
quire a less charge, or even none at all. The reasonable requests of brother law-
yers, and of their widows and orphans without ample means, should receive spe-
cial and kindly consideration. In determining the amount of the fee, it is proper to
consider: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the cause;
(2) whether the acceptance of employment in the particular case will preclude the
lawyer's appearance for others in cases likely to arise out of the transaction, and
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guage contained in the current DR 2-106(B), 100 shows surprisingly
few changes. Arguably, the only substantive change made in as-
sessing an attorney's fee in the present Code as compared with the
1887 Alabama Code and the 1907 ABA Code of Professional Eth-
ics, is the addition of superfluous language. For example, DR 2-
106(B)(7) refers to "the experience . . . and ability of the lawyer
. . . performing the services." It is difficult to see how this lan-
guage adds to the already present consideration of "skill requisite
to properly conduct the cause." Another substantive change re-
sulted from the addition of DR 2-106(B)(5), which encompasses
the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances. One
can assume that this factor is meant to justify additional compen-
sation when the attorney is constrained by an unusually short time
period because of the nature of the litigation. If so, the same justi-
fication can be derived from DR 2-106(B)(2), which refers to the
preclusion of other employment. It can fairly be concluded that the
factors listed in DR 2-106(B) are essentially unchanged from the
1907 Canons.
B. Application of the DR 2-106(B) Guidelines in Domestic
Relations Disputes-The Standard of Review
Before DR 2-106(B) factors can be applied to domestic relations
cases, the standard of review should be addressed. In domestic re-
lations cases, trial courts have traditionally been accorded broad
discretion in determining the amount of the fee. Generally, appel-
late courts will not modify an attorney's fee award absent a show-
ing of abuse of discretion by the lower court.'0 ' A Pennsylvania
in which there is a reasonable expectation that otherwise he would be employed,
or will involve the loss of other business while employed in the particular case or
antagonisms with other clients; (3) the customary charges of the Bar for similar
services; (4) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to
the client from the services; (5) the contingency or the certainty of the compensa-
tion; and (6) the character of the employment, whether casual or for an estab-
lished and constant client. No one of these considerations in itself is controlling.
They are mere guides in ascertaining the real value of the service. In fixing fees it
should never be forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of
justice and not a mere money-getting trade.
XXXIII Reports of American Bar Association, Final Report of the Committee on Code of
Professional Ethics 578 (1908).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
101. See, e.g., Alabama: West v. West, 437 So. 2d 583 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983); Rosser v.
Rosser, 355 So. 2d 717 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977), cert. denied, 355 So. 2d 722 (Ala. 1978); Cali-
fornia: In re Marriage of Stephenson, 209 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); In re Mar-
riage of Cueva, 149 Cal. Rptr. 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); District of Columbia: Smith v.
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court has observed that "[t]here are no fixed rules as to the
amount to be allowed.' 0 2
Unfortunately, with no rules the standard of review for deter-
mining abuse of discretion in such cases becomes hopelessly ob-
scure. As one judge remarked: "The phrase 'abuse of discretion'
may be so used as to equally express almost opposite and contrary
meanings . . . [and] [flew opinions of our courts have discussed
the diverse meanings of the phrase."' 03 Some courts simply provide
no rationale for finding an abuse of discretion;0 4 others find abuse
of discretion where the record is devoid of any evidence supporting
the lower court's award. 05 Still other courts find an abuse of dis-
cretion only "if [the] court determines that the trial court could
not have reasonably concluded as it did."10 6 Lastly, there are
courts which merely state the obvious: "[I]t [will] require an ex-
tremely strong showing to convince this court that an award is so
arbitrary as to constitute an abuse of discretion.' ' 0 7 Such state-
ments do little to promote a uniform standard for review. Lower
Smith, 445 A.2d 666 (D.C. 1982); Illinois: Faris v. Faris, 492 N.E.2d 645 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986);
Indiana: Finley v. Finley, 422 N.E.2d 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Maryland: Head v. Head,
505 A.2d 868 (Md. Ct. App. Spec. 1986); Mississippi: McKee v. McKee, 418 So. 2d 764
(Miss. 1982); Missouri: Wonneman v. Wonneman, 305 S.W.2d 71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957);
Nebraska: Meyers v. Meyers, 383 N.W.2d 784 (Neb. 1986); New York: Apkarian v.
Apkarian, 331 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972) (modification of support); Oregon: In re
Marriage of Craig, 567 P.2d 141 (Or. Ct. App. 1977); South Carolina: Prince v. Prince, 328
S.E.2d 664 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985); Tennessee: Connors v. Connors, 594 S.W.2d 672 (Tenn.
1980); Texas: Danache v. Danache, 296 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Utah: Kerr v.
Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980); Washington: Abel v. Abel, 289 P.2d 724 (Wash. 1955).
102. Brong v. Brong, 195 A. 439 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1937).
103. In re Marriage of McMahon, 403 N.E.2d 730, 736 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (Trapp, J.,
concurring). Justice Craven's dissenting opinion is even more critical of the standard of re-
view encompassed by the phrase "abuse of discretion":
To say a trial court abused its discretion without any elucidation is nothing more
than saying it made an erroneous decision or a judgment rendered in violation of
the law. . . . 'Judicial discretion' is an unfortunate appellation for a legal concept
that means little more than that the trial court's actions are not clearly proscribed
by the law in the sense that the trial court can make alternative decisions without
offending the law. Although the term "judicial discretion" is entrenched in legal
jargon, it always should be remembered that any discretion a judge may exercise
properly must be legal. Indeed, judicial power as distinguished from the power of
the laws, has no existence.
Id. at 738 (citations omitted) (Craven, J., dissenting).
104. See, e.g., West v. West, 437 So. 2d 582 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983).
105. McKee v. McKee, 418 So. 2d 764 (Miss. 1982); Delatore v. Delatore, 680 P.2d 27
(Utah 1984). Contra Gould v. Gould, 267 N.E.2d 652 (Mass. 1971) (appellate court conceded
there was no reported evidence on which the trial judge could have based an attorney's fee
award, but noted "[h]is subsidiary findings support his conclusion.") Id. at 655.
106. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 459 A.2d 498, 502 (Conn. 1983) (citations omitted).
107. Ritz v. Ritz, 197 A.2d 155, 156-57 (D.C. 1964).
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court decisions thus appear to be reversed or modified by the roll
of the dice whenever the appellate court disagrees with the fee
awarded.
C. DR 2-106(B)(1)-The Time and Labor Required, the
Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions Involved, and the Skill
Requisite to Perform the Legal Service Properly
This catchall category is most conveniently analyzed in terms of
its component phrases.
1. The Time and Labor Required
In reviewing fee awards in domestic relations cases, courts have
taken varying positions as to the importance of the number of at-
torney hours spent. Often, courts consider hours expended to be of
minimal importance.108 Some courts view an award formula of
multiplying hours worked by hourly rate as too simplistic:109 "More
must be shown to justify an award of fees than a compilation of
hours and an hourly rate."110 Still other courts view the time and
labor factor as unnecessary when the actual number of hours ex-
pended limits the amount of fees the court considers appropri-
ate."1 In rejecting a claim by the husband that the attorney's fee
award for the wife's attorney should have been based on an hourly
108. See Donner v. Donner, 281 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 287 So. 2d 679
(Fla. 1973). In Donner, the court reduced an award of $85,000 to the wife's attorney to
$50,000. Though the attorney testified that he spent approximately 175 to 200 hours on the
case, the appellate court noted that even if the higher figure of 200 hours were accepted,
"the fee would amount to approximately $425 an hour for services, which we find to be
excessive." Id. at 400. The dissenting judge felt the time spent was not conclusive, "'since
an experienced or skilful attorney might accomplish in a very short time what another
would require a much longer time to accomplish.'" Id. at 402 (Henry, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted); see also Donnelly v. Donnelly, 400 N.E.2d 56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). The court
finds that "the time factor is probably given the same weight or greater weight than any
other factor." Id. at 59-60.
109. Illinois: In Re Marriage of Jacobson, 411 N.E.2d 947 (Il. App. Ct. 1980); New
Jersey: Mayer v. Mayer, 434 A.2d 614 (N.J. Super.), cert. denied, 443 A.2d 709 (N.J. 1981);
Ohio: Swanson v. Swanson, 355 N.E.2d 894 (Ohio App. Ct. 1976); Utah: Kerr v. Kerr, 610
P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980). Contra Florida: Posner v. Posner, 315 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1975); Ne-
braska: Barber v. Barber, 296 N.W.2d. 463 (Neb. 1980).
110. In re Marriage of Pedersen, 396 N.E.2d 659, 662 (11. App. Ct. 1979).
111. For example, in Darden v. Witham, 209 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1974), the court approved
an attorney's fee award of $175,000. The wife's attorneys, without the benefit of adequate
time records, estimated they had spent 750 hours on the matter. One of the dissenting
judges noted that this compensation amounted to $233 per hour which, by 1974 standards,
was commanded by few practitioners.
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rate, the court in Finley v. Finley" 2 noted that the hours expended
may not reflect the quality of the work. The court considered it
important to focus on the quality of work, noting that the attor-
neys were required to provide a variety of complex services."' A
few courts, however, have recognized two serious shortcomings in
simply using hours spent as a rationale for awarding attorney's
fees. A primary weakness stems from the nature of domestic rela-
tions litigation. Influenced perhaps by motivations having little to
do with the tangible assets, custody of minor children, or other is-
sues in dispute,11 4 domestic relations clients often use more of the
litigation process-and therefore the attorney's time-than is war-
ranted by the factual or legal issues presented by the case. This
problem was discussed in Sharp v. Sharp:115
The trial court heard sixty-one witnesses- why it was so patient,
we do not know. This court has been bombarded with motions by
all parties, and after we had ruled we were almost always con-
fronted with motions to reconsider. We presume that a plea to
112. 422 N.E.2d 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
113. Id. at 293; see also Pfohl v. Pfohl, 345 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), where the
appellate court held an attorney's fee award of $30,000 was not an abuse of discretion even
though the attorney worked only approximately 100 hours on the matter. The resulting fee,
approximately $300 an hour, was held appropriate in part because the court found the case
to be unique as the husband had been awarded alimony, and because "attorney's fees should
be awarded based in large measure on the quality of services rendered and not necessarily
on the quantity of service." Id. at 379. Accord Barber v. Barber, 296 N.W.2d 463 (Neb.
1980).
114. The emergence of the availability of no-fault divorce has not eliminated the emo-
tional discord present in many dissolution of marriage cases. See generally Glass, No-fault
Divorce Law: Impact on Judge and Client, 5 J. FAM. ISSUEs 47 (1984); Grana, Post-Divorce
Counseling: A Process for Implementing the Role of Separate-But-Joint Parent, 21 J. FAM.
L. 687 (1983). The current popularity of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms has not
provided a solution:
Given the advantages of negotiated settlements, why do divorcing spouses ever
require courtroom adjudication of their disputes? There are a variety of reasons
why some divorce cases will be litigated:
1. Spite. One or both parties may be motivated in substantial measure by a
desire to punish the other spouse, rather than simply to increase their own net
worth.
2. Calling the Bluff-The Breakdown of Negotiations. If the parties get heavily
engaged in strategic behavior and get carried away with making threats, a court-
room battle may result, despite both parties' preference for a settlement. Negotia-
tions may resemble a game of "chicken" in which two teenagers set their cars on a
collision course to see who turns first. Some crack-ups may result.
Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950, 974-75 (1979). See also Wade, Negotiating Family Settlements Benefits and
Barriers, 4 CAN. J. FAM. L. 49, 53-59 (1973).
115. 491 S.W.2d 639 (Ky. 1973).
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cease and desist would be as unavailing as requesting the mighty
Ohio to flow upstream. Such deluge of attacks only impedes the
efforts of this court to keep abreast of its business. Please, no
more.
116
One suspects that in cases such as Sharp, spouses would be less
willing to engage in protracted legal battles if they were solely re-
sponsible for compensating their own attorneys.1 1 7 When the client
is assured of receiving an award for attorney's fees from the oppos-
ing spouse, there is arguably less incentive for efficient use of attor-
ney time, the court's time, or other resources.118 A client may not
be the only party prompted by improper motives. Although not
restricted to domestic relations cases, a potential ethical issue
arises when the attorney is confident that legal fees will be paid by
the opposing party.119 In a domestic relations dispute in which one
116. Id. at 641. See also Swanson v. Swanson, 355 N.E.2d 894 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976),
where the court reversed a lower court award of $12,380 attorney's fees payable by the hus-
band to the wife's counsel, stating: "[I]t is recognized that domestic relations cases tend to
consume a considerable amount of time and that counsel must generally realize that he
cannot always expect full compensation for the time so consumed." Id. at 899. Accord Guth-
rie v. Guthrie, 357 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
117. Situations where a litigating party is expected to pay all or part of his adversary's
attorney's fee should be contrasted to the paradigm where the client is responsible for his
own fee on an hourly basis. According to a recent empirical study of the hourly-fee lawyer,
the level of involvement and control exercised by the client can significantly re-
duce the amount of time the lawyer spends on the case. Thus, if the lawyer is
clearly aware of the client's desires, and those desires include economical, efficient
handling of the case, the lawyer is (responsible) [sic] to those desires.
Kritzer, Sarat, Trubek, Bumiller & McNichol, Understanding the Costs of Litigation: The
Case of the Hourly-Fee Lawyer, 1984 Am. B. FOUND. Ras. J. 559, 593.
118. In Rizzo v. Rizzo, 420 N.E.2d 555 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981), the court commented on the
all-too-common practice of lawyers making needless objections throughout the litigation.
"Necessarily, the time spent in acrimonious and lengthy objections and arguments on the
most minor of points abound throughout. To run up chargeable attorneys' time in that type
of proceeding would be inappropriate and in effect would reward an attorney for wasting
time." Id. at 566. Accord Olmstead v. Murphy, 489 N.E.2d 707 (Mass. App.), review denied,
492 N.E.2d 98 (Mass. 1986).
119. Several authors have noted the potential ethical problems caused by the availability
of attorney's fees in public interest litigation. One commentator notes:
[Wihen an attorney prevails in a public interest suit, the fees may be paid by the
adversary, not the client. Thus the availability of attorneys' fees encourages litiga-
tion with two objectives: relief for the client, and recovery for the attorney. These
interests are independent and they can be divergent, even conflicting, incentives
for public interest litigation.
Moreover, attorneys' fees award [sic] are determined by the work spent, not the
money awarded to the client. The rate awarded is the market rate and thus the
award may exceed either the amount of the recovery awarded to the plaintiff, the
budget of the defendant, or other conventional constraints. Attorneys' fees awards
plainly serve the public interest as both an incentive to litigate and as a sanction
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spouse has substantial assets, attorneys may be tempted to pad
hours with unnecessary research, 20 superfluous court appear-
ances,12 1  or questionable strategy sessions,12' anticipating full
compensation.
The second major problem in relying on total hours spent as a
measure of compensation is that the hours are analytically mean-
ingful only when it is clear they were productive in leading to a
resolution of specific issues in the litigation."18 Not all the time
spent by an attorney in domestic relations practice can reasonably
against obdurate defendants. But with this same force, they pose the clear risk of
becoming ends unto themselves.
LaFrance, Public Interest Litigation, Attorneys' Fees, and Attorneys' Ethics, 16 ENVTL. L.
335, 337 (1986) (emphasis in original); see also Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89
HAsv. L. REv. 1318, 1605 (1976). The potential for independent or conflicting interests be-
tween an attorney and client may occur in domestic relations cases as easily as in cases
involving public interest issues.
120. See, e.g., Davis v. Taylor, 344 S.E.2d 19 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986), a paternity action in
which the child's father, a professional football player, successfully overturned an award of
attorney's fees and costs totaling $45,000. Even though the father admitted paternity early
in the litigation, the mother's attorneys sought compensation for "researching and preparing
the novel argument that it would be in the best interest of the child to receive a lump sum
for future child support." Id. at 26. The court of appeals remanded the case for a further
hearing on the attorney's fees issue, stating: "The attorneys . . . sought to charge an ex-
tremely- large number of hours to their adversary. . . . This presented great danger that
'billing judgment' would suffer; there is less incentive to exclude unnecessary or unreasona-
ble hours when the adversary, as opposed to the client, will foot the bill." Id.
121. See Gasperini v. Gasperini, 373 N.E.2d 576 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (attorney sought fee
award for filing complaint and other documents with clerk, obtaining agreed order granting
appearance of opponent's co-counsel, and obtaining an order for temporary fees).
122. In reducing an attorney's fee award from $8,000 to $5,000 for an appeal arising out
of a marriage dissolution, a Florida court noted that the attorney claimed 91 hours were
spent on the appeal, 20 of which were in conference with his client. The court stated:
It was necessary, counsel testified, for him to confer with his client to determine
what points should be raised on appeal and what should be included in the appen-
dix. In addition, the client participated with counsel in redrafting the several
rough drafts of appellant's briefs.. . . Work done that is not reasonably necessary
but performed to indulge the eccentricities of the client should more properly be
charged to the client rather than the opposing party.
Guthrie v. Guthrie, 357 So. 2d 247, 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
The case is interesting from another standpoint. The wife's counsel admitted his client
helped prepare the briefs filed in the appeal. As the appeal was successful on some of the
issues raised, one wonders if the court would allow the $5,000 fee assessed against the hus-
band to be shared by the client.
123. There can be little doubt that the number of hours spent is not synonymous with
the value or quality of services rendered. See generally Clermont & Currivan, Improving on
the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 529, 540-43, 568-69 (1978). See also Kritzer, Sarat,
Trubek, Bumiller & McNichol, supra note 117, at 588-89, where the authors conclude that
hourly rates "do not appear to be a function of case-related factors (e.g., stakes, complexity,
participant goals), and they appear to be minimally related to lawyer skill, qualifications,
and the like."
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be billed to either the client or the adversary. Referring to the per-
ceived role of a male attorney in a matrimonial setting in the
1970's, one evidently chauvinistic writer commented:
From the day a woman first consults a lawyer about her marital
problems, until about a year after the matrimonial judgment is
rendered, her attorney's role as legal counselor also requires him
to act as surrogate husband. Problems about the children and
family finances become shadowed and disarranged by the break-
down of the marriage, and they are invariably presented by the
wife to her lawyer for solution.12"
Although few would disagree that the matrimonial lawyer has pe-
culiar problems because of the time-consuming nature of the ser-
vices provided, the number of hours reflected in the fee to be borne
by the opposing spouse should represent primarily time spent on
legal matters. A few courts have appropriately condemned the
practice of seeking an award of attorney's fees for time spent which
has no relevance to the unique skills of the profession. 12 5 Given the
development of family counseling and other social services agencies
as adjuncts to domestic relations courts, 126 the concept of the at-
torney as surrogate husband is unnecessary and demeaning to both
the wife and the attorney. Courts called upon to determine appro-
priate attorney's fees awards must acknowledge that "time spent
may have been unnecessary and unproductive or entirely dispro-
portionate to the result to be achieved. 1 27 An Ohio opinion cata-
logs 263 telephone conferences and 37 office conferences.1 28 The
124. Spellman, supra note 10, at 54, 56.
125. Ernest v. Ernest, 407 N.Y.S.2d 294 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978), represents the type of
analysis which more courts should apply. Rejecting the wife's plea that the attorney's fee
award of $1,500 to be paid by the husband was insufficient given the hours counsel had
devoted to the case, the court said,
Counsel have submitted time sheets showing extensive services to the wife. Un-
doubtedly, these services represent valuable advice and assistance given her by
her attorneys. Much of the time billed does not appear to have been necessarily
involved in protecting the wife's interests in this matrimonial action or the legal
matters preliminary to it, however, and the husband should not be obliged to pay
for unrelated services.
Id.; see also In Re Marriage of Brophy, 421 N.E.2d 1308 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); In Re Marriage
of Kruse, 416 N.E.2d 40 (Il. App. Ct. 1980); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 191 N.W.2d 177 (S.D. 1971).
126. See generally Special Section on Mediation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 451 (1984); Pearson, Me-
diation and Divorce: The Benefits Outweigh the Costs, FAM. ADvoc., Winter 1982, at 26;
Blackburn, When Your Client Needs Family Service Counseling, 4 FAM. L.Q. 71 (1970);
Kelly, The Oklahoma Family Clinic, 1 FAM. L.Q., Mar. 1967, at 34.
127. In re Marriage of Cueva, 149 Cal. Rptr. 918, 926 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
128. Swanson v. Swanson, 355 N.E.2d 894 (Ohio App. Ct. 1976).
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court noted that although the facts of the case may have made
many consultations necessary, "there comes a time when counsel is
obliged to limit such conferences or accept the fact that he cannot
always expect full renumeration for the time so consumed.' 129
2. The Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions Involved
One justification for considering the novelty and difficulty of liti-
gation involving public interest issues is to "provide plaintiffs as-
serting specified federal rights with fees which are adequate to at-
tract competent counsel."' 10 This justification is inappropriate as a
fee consideration in most domestic relations cases. No incentive is
needed to attract competent counsel to practice domestic relations
law, just as little incentive is needed to attract counsel to practice
in the areas of workers' compensation, medical malpractice, or
products liability. However, the same cannot be said of environ-
mental law. In litigation brought on behalf of conservationists,
plaintiff's counsel is burdened by the limited span of time within
which action must be taken. Litigation is often begun "in the
shadow of the bulldozer." Immediate injunctions must be sought,
resulting in expedited trial schedules. Discovery may be seriously
abridged and difficult, as officials avoid divulging important infor-
mation. The administrative record, usually crucial in such proceed-
ings, may be an unwieldy assortment of documents. It is often im-
possible to schedule all needed depositions. 13 1
In addition to time constraints, plaintiffs' attorneys in environ-
mental and other public interest litigation most often engage in
extensive litigation on complex issues such as standing3 2 or chal-
lenges to institutional or bureaucratic practices. 3 In contrast, at-
129. Id. at 900 (quoting DeWitt v. Dewitt, 191 N.W.2d 177 (S.D. 1971)). Accord Moreau
v. Moreau, 293 N.E.2d 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973).
130. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 444 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting S. REP. No. 94-1011, p.6 (1976)).
131. Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Adminis-
trative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 618-19 (1970) (footnote omitted).
132. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc. 438 U.S. 59 (1978);
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); see also Note, Citizen Standing in Environmen-
tal Licensing Procedures: Not in My Neighborhood!, 18 IND. L. REV. 989 (1985).
133. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), where the Court commented on the
difficulty of questions in complex civil rights cases: "This type of litigation is lengthy and
demands many hours of lawyers' services." Id. at 436. It might be argued that cases involv-
ing a substantial marital estate may be considered an exception because of the varying tax
consequences of property distribution or maintenance and support which might be consid-
ered. On the other hand, if the litigation involves a private taxpayer and the Internal Reve-
nue Service, the taxpayer's attorney's fees are generally not paid by the federal government,
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torneys involved in domestic relations cases will normally encoun-
ter few cases involving standing or other issues which could be
deemed novel or complex.'3" Although factual matters may be
hotly contested, the theories and controlling case law and statutes
typically render the issues routine, albeit emotionally charged. 13 5
An Illinois court illustrated this point in reversing a $6,000 fee
award in a case where the only issues were child support, custody,
and visitation. The court found no novel or difficult issues nor that
the attorney had assumed exceptional responsibilities in the litiga-
tion. The court stressed the importance of a finding of complexity
in the issues presented: "Although the question of custody, visita-
tion and child support is highly charged in terms of emotion, it is
not specifically complex in terms of the legal skills involved and
the labor to be employed as would justify an award of $6,000. '' s
In contrast, other courts have often demonstrated confusion in
dealing with fees awarded on the basis of the novelty and complex-
ity of the issues or the vitriolic tenor of the litigation.'8 7
no matter how novel the question. Accordingly, if a spouse asserts that he has been particu-
larly benefited by unique or novel tax advice as a result of a domestic relations dispute, the
party benefited should be required to pay the legal costs for such services. Cf. Darden v.
Witham, 209 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1974) (Littlejohn, J., concurring and dissenting).
134. Of course, where the statutory law in the jurisdiction has been recently modified,
extensive research on issues which may be considered as breaking new ground should be
compensated. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Thornton, 412 N.E.2d 1336 (IM. App. Ct. 1980)
(necessity of lawyers and paralegals spending extra time researching recently enacted Mar-
riage Act to determine its effect on the litigation). Counsel also should be compensated
where the case presents unusual and extreme procedural obstacles. See, e.g., Berry v. Chap-
lin, 169 P.2d 453 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946) (paternity proceeding against famous actor with
extensive procedural motions, arguments, and briefs on two separate petitions for writ of
mandate, two jury trials, and collateral criminal case).
135. Moreland v. Moreland, 374 P.2d 741, 746, reh'g denied, 375 P.2d 242 (Or. 1962).
136. In Re Marriage of Brophy, 421 N.E.2d 1308, 1317 (IMI. App. Ct. 1981) (citations
omitted) (emphasis supplied). Accord In re Marriage of Kruse, 416 N.E.2d. 40 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980).
137. E.g., Rachal v. Rachal, 489 A.2d 476 (D.C. 1985). The Rachal court criticized a
lower court for considering the respective motivations of the parties, stating:
The fact that the litigation may have been burdensome or oppressive to the party
requesting such fees may properly be considered by the court in deciding whether
to grant the request at all, but it should not be considered in determining the
amount of the award. To add to the calculus any factor such as the motivation of
either party in pursuing the litigation creates the very real risk of turning an
award of attorney's fees into punitive damages, which are beyond the power of a
divorce court to grant.
Id. at 478; cf. Travieso v. Travieso, 447 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), modified on other
grounds, 474 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 1985); Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984).
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3. The Skill Requisite to Perform the Legal Service Properly
This factor is closely related to DR 2-106(B)(7), which provides
for evaluation of "the experience, reputation, and ability of the
lawyer. . . performing the services," and thus is implicated as well
by the following discussion. Courts inexplicably find that the ser-
vice provided in domestic relations cases necessarily involved a
great amount of skill. For example, a recent Massachusetts deci-
sion'" affirmed an award of $15,000 to be paid by the husband to
the wife's attorney. The court noted that the legal theory of in-
sanity, used by the wife in defense of the suit brought by her hus-
band, had "long been accepted."139 However, in justifying the fee
award the court stated that the wife's attorney's services "included
... the preparation of a somewhat complicated insanity de-
fense. 14 0 Even when courts purportedly take into consideration
the specialized skill required of an attorney in handling a matter,
the skill is inevitably and often inappropriately linked to the size
of the marital estate or the total monetary or other benefit ob-
tained for the wife.141
D. DR 2-106(B)(2)-The Likelihood, if Apparent to the Client,
That the Acceptance of the Particular Employment Will
Preclude Other Employment by the Lawyer
One commentator has suggested that this factor implicates two
distinct theories upon which to base an attorney's compensation:
loss of billable hours and loss of potential business. A pof either
party in pursuing the litigation creates the very real risk of turning
an award of attorney's fees into punitive elements which might
cause the attorney to lose future business because of his associa-
tion with the cause. 14 2 In the disciplinary rule, the conditional
phrase "if apparent to the client," obviously refers to a fee dispute
between an attorney and client and not to litigation in which a
138. Hano v. Hano, 367 N.E.2d 1190 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977).
139. Id. at 1192.
140. Id.
141. Cf. Adams v. Adams, 376 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. denied, 388 So. 2d
1109 (Fla. 1980). Compare Finley v. Finley, 422 N.E.2d 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (size of
marital estate not of primary importance in determining a fee), with In re Marriage of
Kathrens, 615 P.2d 1079 (Or. App. Ct. 1980) (The court approved award of $38,000 for
wife's attorney's fees stating: "There can be no doubt about the magnitude of the wife's
interest nor the difficult questions surrounding the valuation of several active businesses
and other investments and cash flow problems associated with structuring and paying a
judgment of this size.") Id. at 1085.
142. 1 S. SPEisER, ArrONEYS' FEEs § 8.7 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
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party is ordered to pay the adversary's attorney's fees. In any
event, a fee award based in part on an attorney's preclusion from
handling other cases is illogical if the party paying the fee is the
client's adversary. Moreover, if the time and labor required and
the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved are considered
in assessing an appropriate attorney's fee, those factors implicitly
include consideration that the time expended on the litigation
could not be billed to another client.
Although preclusion of other employment is occasionally men-
tioned by courts when determining attorney's fees, it is seldom an-
alyzed. 43 Burke v. Burke,44 an early Kentucky case, exemplifies
the cursory manner in which this factor is treated in domestic rela-
tions cases. In a one-page opinion, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's order awarding $400 to the wife's attor-
ney. After noting the husband's net worth and that he owned a
florist shop, the court stated: "In a vigorously contested divorce
case which involves people of prominence in the community, there
is often present unpleasantness and quite frequently future reper-
cussions upon the attorney's practice. 1' 45 The court gave no indica-
tion that such repercussions were present in the case. However, as-
suming that they were, the court failed to indicate the weight this
factor should be given in determining an appropriate attorney's fee
award.
Any argument that an attorney should receive a premium for the
time consumed by a particular case ignores the reality of the finite
number of hours which can be billed during any given period. An
example may help to illustrate this point:
Attorney A is counsel for W, the wife, in a particularly bitter, and
hard-fought action for dissolution of a thirty-year marriage. The
dissolution action involves valuation of a closely-held corporation
and a real estate partnership, myriad tax considerations and a
challenge to a pre-nuptial agreement. Given the complexity of the
estate and the vitriolic dealings between H and W, the litigation
consumes 75% of Attorney A's monthly billable14 hours for sev-
143. See Fernandez v. Fernandez, 15 Cal. Rptr. 374 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
144. 182 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1944).
145. Id.
146. Billable hours is emphasized here because the adversary against whom a fee is as-
sessed should be in no worse position than if the client were paying the fee. If an attorney
would not expect compensation from a client for hours spent on research which proved un-
necessary or for doing routine office procedures, such as photocopying or filing routine docu-
ments in court, there is scant justification for expecting the client's adversary to pay such
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eral months. Attorney A seeks an attorney's fee award from H,
which includes consideration that the case has consumed 3 of
her monthly billable hours.
Assuming that the court finds the total billable hours reasonable,
one questions how Attorney A could expect an added premium
when the case generated seventy-five percent of her total billable
hours. Were she not engaged with this matter, it does not necessa-
rily follow that her total monthly billable hours would increase." 7
To the contrary, when an attorney is continously engaged in a sin-
gle case, it is reasonable to assume that the total billable hours
generated will be as much or more than that which could be gener-
ated by laboring on several unrelated matters.14 8
Loss of potential business-the second theory postulated for us-
ing preclusion of employment in determining a reasonable attor-
ney's fee-is equally inappropriate. Using the hypothetical exam-
ple above, if an attorney's fee award considered loss of potential
business, H would be required to pay Attorney A a premium be-
cause A might be precluded from later representing H, or any of
H's business associates. The difficulties of evaluation are clear.
Would it be reasonable, for instance, to require Attorney A to pre-
sent witnesses-perhaps other lawyers-who could speculate that
Attorney A's involvement in this particularly bitter divorce would
result in a ten percent drop in A's estimated number of new clients
for a year? What if the reverse were true? Assume that the nature
of the divorce proceedings was generally known in the community.
Suppose Attorney A's representation of W in the contested litiga-
tion enhanced A's reputation in the community, causing an ex-
pected ten percent increase in new clients. Should the attorney's
fee award which H would normally be assessed be reduced because
of the business potential he has provided for A's legal practice?
charges. Referring to a fee award dispute under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the Supreme Court recently commented, "'In the private sector,
'billing judgment' is an important component in fee setting. It is no less important here.
Hours that are not properly billed to one's client also are not properly billed to one's adver-
sary pursuant to statutory authority."' Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1982)
(quoting Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (emphasis in
original)).
147. See generally Clermont & Currivan, supra note 123, at 542-43.
148. But see Robinson v. Champion, 475 S.W.2d 677 (Ark. 1972), a suit initiated by a
client to recover excess fees where the court seemed persuaded by an attorney's testimony
that he "spent almost his full time on the case from the time he was employed until the trial
started," despite his inability to provide documentation of the time. Id. at 684.
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Though most courts would probably answer the latter question
negatively, the concept of imposing a penalty on the party ordered
to pay an opponent's legal fees because of a potential loss of busi-
ness to the opposing attorney is no less speculative than the idea of
rewarding the opponent who indirectly enhances counsel's fee
potential.
E. DR 2-106(B)(3)-The Fee Customarily Charged in the
Locality for Similar Legal Services
Advisory or voluntary fee schedules were adopted by state and
local bar associations beginning in the mid-1930's,'4 9 and were in
widespread use until prohibited in 1975.50 Accordingly, in discuss-
ing this factor, courts in early domestic relations cases frequently
referred to such fee schedules in determining the fairness of a par-
ticular award.1 51 Though modern courts do not have fee schedules
available for reference, courts routinely refer to the fee customarily
charged in the locality for similar services.5' How do courts dis-
cern the usual fee charged for similar services? Two primary meth-
ods have been employed, neither of which is satisfactory.
1. The Trial Judge as Expert
One method for determining the customary local fee is that the
court simply styles itself an "expert" on what constitutes a reason-
able attorney's fee. The trial judge is then able to use a veiled per-
sonal assessment of an appropriate amount for attorneys' fees.1' s
149. Album, Some Researches Into the Matter of Minimum Fees for Lawyers, 21 A.B.A.
J. 56 (1935). The author reports that outside of Ohio, minimum fee schedules existed only in
New Orleans, Long Beach, and the Pennsylvania counties of Alexander and Washington. Id.
at 57; see also F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEAL SERvicEs 22 (1964); 1 S. SPEISER.
ArroRNEY's FEES § 8.14 (1973); Nations, Minimum Fee Schedules, 11 Mo. B.J. 27 (1940).
150. Fee schedules were prohibited by the Supreme Court decision of Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
151. See, e.g., Junker v. Junker, 198 N.W.2d 189 (Neb. 1972).
152. See, e.g., Illinois: In re Marriage of Brophy, 421 N.E.2d 1308 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981);
Nebraska: Campbell v. Campbell, 276 N.W.2d 220 (Neb. 1979); Tennessee: Connors v.
Connors, 594 S.W.2d 672 (Tenn. 1980).
153. See, e.g., Alabama: Rosser v. Rosser, 355 So. 2d 717 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977), cert.
denied, 355 So. 2d 722 (Ala. 1978); Indiana: Canaday v. Canaday, 467 N.E.2d 783 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984); Iowa: In re Marriage of Jayne, 200 N.W.2d 532 (Iowa 1972); Massachusetts:
Olmstead v. Murphy, 489 N.E.2d 707, review denied, 492 N.E.2d 98 (Mass. 1986); Ne-
braska: Junker v. Junker, 198 N.W.2d 189 (Neb. 1972); South Dakota: Stanton v. Saks,
311 N.W.2d 584 (S.D. 1981); accord Texas: Berg v. Berg, 232 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950). But see Florida: Lyle v. Lyle, 167 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 172 So. 2d
601 (Fla. 1964) ("The reasonableness of the attorney's fee is not the subject of judicial no-
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Use of this method was approved in a recent Indiana case'" in
which the court stated: "[Slince the judge is considered an expert,
our decisions . . .adhere to the view that he may judicially know
what constitutes a reasonable fee."1 53 Because not all trial court
judges have domestic relations litigation experience before donning
their robes, one wonders how those without such expertise come to
learn what constitutes a reasonable fee. Even if trial judges had
such experience as practitioners, it is questionable whether this is
an accurate barometer of current economics of the practice of
law.'56 The court's gut feelings "doubtless reflect valuable experi-
ence, but are an inadequate basis for review"1 5 and do little to
enhance the public's perception that attorney's fee awards are
made with an eye to fairness to all parties.158
2. Other Members of the Profession as "Experts"
Another method employed by courts in determining fee awards
is the use of "expert" testimony from other members of the bar as
tice, neither is it to be left to local custom, conjecture or guesswork."). Accord California:
In Re Marriage of Cueva, 149 Cal. Rptr. 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); Illinois: In Re Marriage
of Brophy, 421 N.E.2d 1308 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); South Carolina: Prince v. Prince, 328
S.E.2d 664 (S.C. 1985); Utah: Butler v. Butler, 461 P.2d 727 (Utah 1969).
154. Canaday v. Canaday, 467 N.E.2d 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
155. Id. at 785. See also Smith v. Smith, 470 So. 2d 1252 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985) (sug-
gesting determination of attorney's fees award is unreviewable because trial court may rely
on its knowledge of value of attorney's services).
156. As a commentator noted in 1924:
It is a fair generalization of the answers of the lawyers who have been kind enough
to attempt to discuss the matter of fees ... that the charges have been based on
personal experience of what the traffic will bear, helped out as to routine matters
in the beginning by the example of what others are reputed to be charging for
similar services . . .. In other words, lawyers' fees are in actual practice fixed very
largely on the same general experimental basis as the values of other services or
commodities are fixed in the haggle of the market. The haggling is not quite so
manifest on the surface as it is in a commercial auction room but it is present just
the same.
Vold, supra note 91, at 230-31.
157. Olmstead v. Murphy, 489 N.E.2d 707, 709, review denied, 492 N.E.2d 98 (Mass.
1986).
158. A recent Illinois decision illustrates one further potential problem of appellate re-
view if the court determines the appropriate attorney's fee by relying on its own experience.
In Gasperini v. Gasperini, 373 N.E.2d 576 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978), the court noted that the case
appeared to be fairly ordinary. Without comment as to the source of the hourly rate it
imposed, the court stated: "[W]e conclude that a fair overall rate in this case would be $45
per hour. We are of the opinion this would constitute adequate compensation for the neces-
sary services performed." Id. at 582. Following this pronouncement, would trial courts
within this appellate district be bound by the $45 per hour figure for routine domestic
cases?
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to the value of the services rendered.8 9 Not surprisingly, those tes-
tifying on behalf of the attorney seeking a large fee award are sup-
portive of the award, and those testifying on behalf of a client
seeking to limit the attorney's fee award give testimony supporting
a more modest fee award. As an Ohio jurist observed in 1912:
Many attorneys act upon the principle of the French minister,
Colbert, who in the matter of taxation always endeavored to
pluck as many feathers off the goose as he could possibly pluck,
without making the goose squeal.. . . While it may not be known
generally, it is well known to the court that it is next to impossi-
ble to procure an attorney to testify against another attorney in a
claim made by him for his fees. . . . It is easy to secure the testi-
mony of an attorney to testify as to the reasonable value of an-
other attorney's fees, and the public generally have come to look
with distrust and disfavor upon the legal profession because of
this attitude on the part of attorneys and their disposition to aid
one another in securing as much fees as it is possible to secure
from the client."0
When "experts" give their opinion as to what a reasonable fee
would be, based on their own experience and qualifications, the
opinions are generally so far apart in dollar values as to render the
entire process a waste of judicial time. The trial court opinion in
Darden v. Witham"" is illustrative. The court found that the five
attorneys testifying as experts were experienced in the area and
had conscientiously reviewed the extensive file in the case. The at-
torneys stated that they had reviewed the factors listed in Canon
12 for establishing a fee. One of the wife's experts testified that a
reasonable fee would be between $250,000 and $300,000. Another
placed the value at $300,000 to $350,000. Two expert witnesses for
159. See, e.g., Florida: Posner v. Posner, 315 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1975); Larsen v. Larsen,
429 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Adams v. Adams, 376 So. 2d 1204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979);
Illinois: Bellow v. Bellow, 419 N.E.2d 924 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Indiana: Finley v. Finley,
422 N.E 2d 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Iowa: In re Marriage of Jayne, 200 N.W.2d 532 (Iowa
1972); Maryland: Head v. Head, 505 A.2d 868 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986); Oklahoma:
McElreath v. McElreath, 317 P.2d 225 (Okla. 1957); Oregon: Moreland v. Moreland, 374
P.2d 741, reh'g denied, 375 P.2d 242 (Or. 1962); South Carolina: Darden v. Witham, 209
S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1974); Tennessee: Ligon v. Ligon, 597 S.W.2d 310 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979).
160. Prather v. First Presbyterian Soc'y, 25 Ohio Dec. 613 (C.P. 1912), quoted in Romell,
The Reasonable Fee and Professional Discipline, 14 CLa.-MARSHALL L. Rv. 94, 98-99
(1965).
161. 209 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1974).
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the husband concluded that $75,000 would be a reasonable fee. 6 2
When such expert testimony produces a differential of $275,000,
this method of assisting the trial judge in ascertaining the fee cus-
tomarily charged in the community is of dubious value.16 3
F. DR 2-106(B)(4)-The Amount Involved and the Results
Obtained
Of the factors listed as guidelines for determining a reasonable
attorney's fee in DR 2-106(B), none is relied upon more often than
the amount involved and the results obtained.1 64 Courts may give
lip service to the other elements listed in DR 2-106(B), but these
two factors are often treated as the most significant for determin-
ing fee awards in domestic relations cases.16 5 Reliance on results
obtained is especially evident when a reviewing court, upon revers-
ing or modifying a trial court decision on a substantive issue, ad-
justs the attorney's fee or admonishes the lower court to reconsider
the award in light of the new "result."166 For example, in a case
162. Id. at 45-46. The trial court decided that $175,000 was the reasonable value of the
fee to be paid by the husband to the wife's attorney and the amount was affirmed on appeal.
163. See also Snider v. Snider, 375 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (difference between
experts' opinions on value of services rendered was $75,000); Head v. Head, 505 A.2d 868
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (one expert, using three methods of calculation, offered figures
differing by $30,000 to $35,000).
164. See, e.g., Alabama: Burgess v. Burgess, 309 So. 2d 107, writ denied, 309 So. 2d 111
(Ala. 1975); Rosser v. Rosser, 355 So. 2d 717 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977), cert. denied, 355 So. 2d
722 (Ala. 1978); California: In re Marriage of Cueva, 149 Cal. Rptr. 918 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978); District of Columbia: Owen v. Owen, 427 A.2d 933 (D.C. 1981); Illinois: Bellow v.
Bellow, 419 N.E.2d 924 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Indiana: Canaday v. Canaday, 467 N.E.2d 783
(Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Iowa: In re Marriage of Jayne, 200 N.W.2d 532 (Iowa 1972); Ken-
tucky: Sharp v. Sharp, 491 S.W.2d 639 (Ky. 1973); Maryland: Head v. Head, 505 A.2d 868
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986); Nebraska: Barber v. Barber, 296 N.W.2d 463 (Neb. 1980);
New York: Leona G. v. Edwin G., 422 N.Y.S.2d 332 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979); Ohio: Swanson
v. Swanson, 355 N.E.2d 894 (Ohio App. 1976); Oklahoma: McElreath v. McElreath, 317
P.2d 225 (Okla. 1957); Oregon In re Marriage of Kathrens, 615 P.2d 1079 (Or. Ct. App.
1980); South Carolina: Ivey v. Ivey, 334 S.E.2d 123 (S.C. 1985); Miller v. Miller, 313
S.E.2d 288 (S.C. 1984); Tennessee: Connors v. Connors, 594 S.W.2d 672 (Tenn. 1980);
Texas: Danache v. Danache, 296 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Washington: Abel v.
Abel, 289 P.2d 724 (Wash. 1955).
165. Accord Barber v. Barber, 296 N.W.2d 463, 473 (Neb. 1980) (no abuse of discretion
in trial court's determination of attorney's fee award "in view of the size of the marital
estate involved . .. and the results obtained"); Pope v. Pope, 237 P.2d 312 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1951) (justifying award of $15,000 in attorney's fees by noting that wife won judgment
worth $700,000 over her expected life span); see Abel v. Abel, 289 P.2d 724 (Wash. 1955).
166. California: Speer v. Speer, 25 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962); District of
Columbia: Owen v. Owen, 427 A.2d 933 (D.C. 1981); Florida: Rosen v. Rosen, 386 So. 2d
1268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), review denied, 392 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. 1981); Keister v. Keister, 458
So. 2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), review denied, 466 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1985); Nebraska: Mey-
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involving a fee award to the husband, a Florida court addressed
the wife's challenge to the award. The trial court had heard testi-
mony appraising the value of the services at more than $100,000.
The husband's attorney had shown that 1,360 hours were spent on
the case. The appellate court held that the trial court's order re-
quiring the wife to pay more than $50,000 toward the husband's
attorney's fees was not an abuse of discretion; "[hiowever, because
we have decided to reverse the husband's [property distribution]
award . . . and thereby have substantially altered the results ob-
tained . . . we must also reverse the attorney's fee award and re-
mand for reconsideration . . . in light of the final results ob-
tained. '167 Surprisingly, courts in only three jurisdictions 68 have
questioned the propriety of using results obtained in determining
the amount of an attorney's fee award.
There are several reasons why use of this factor is particularly
inappropriate. First, it is illogical, at least in the context of domes-
tic relations cases, to order one spouse to pay for the beneficial
result obtained for the other. This point was made by Judge Brail-
sford, dissenting in Darden v. Witham.'" He noted that the expert
testimony, the trial court's order, and the appellate briefs all em-
phasized the fact that "exertions of esteemed . . . counsel" had
saved the wife more than $1,500,000. "While benefit conferred by
legal services is an important factor for consideration in fixing a fee
to be paid by the benefited client, in all fairness, much less weight
should be given to it when the fee is to be assessed against the
client's adversary.' 70
Second, an award based on the amount involved or the results
obtained in a domestic relations dispute reinforces the inappropri-
ate belief that one party is a winner and the other a loser.' 7' As a
Florida court commented:
era v. Meyers, 383 N.W.2d 784 (Neb. 1986) (modification of child support order); South
Carolina: Stone v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 242 S.E.2d 404 (S.C. 1978).
167. Keister v. Keister, 458 So. 2d 32, 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), review denied, 466 So. 2d
217 (Fla. 1985) (citations omitted).
168. Florida: Valparaiso Bank & Trust Co. v. Sims, 343 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert.
denied, 353 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1977); South Dakota: Flynn v. Flynn, 338 N.W.2d 295 (S.D.
1983); Wisconsin: Hennen v. Hennen, 193 N.W.2d 717 (Wis. 1972); see also South Caro-
lina: Darden v. Witham, 209 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1974) (Brailsford, J., dissenting).
169. 209 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1974).
170. Id. at 48 (Brailsford, J., dissenting); accord Lien v. Lien, 278 N.W.2d 436, 443 (S.D.
1979).
171. Fortunately, with the move toward the concept of no-fault divorce, courts no longer
emphasize the relative fault and blame in adjudicating domestic relations disputes. The ba-
sic premise of the no-fault law is that the nineteenth century concept of divorce, based only
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To exact fee money in an amount determined in such major part
by [the wife's] financial gain from the divorce judgment does not
serve the policy on which such awards are justified. Rather it im-
plies that [the wife] was the "big winner" of a financial contest
and penalizes [the husband] for being the "big loser." We do not
consider that to have been the purpose of awarding fee money in
divorce litigation, and it certainly is not the purpose in today's
dissolution proceedings.17 2
The process of assessment also gives an inaccurate view of the role
of the domestic relations attorney in the litigation process. Unlike
those championing a plaintiff's cause in public interest litigation or
an antitrust dispute, the attorney representing a spouse in a do-
mestic relations matter is not trying to obtain "redress for a legal
injury"-at least not in a no-fault divorce jurisdiction. Accordingly,
in comparison to other civil litigation, there is little justification for
shifting payment of attorney's fees from one spouse to the other on
the basis of the result achieved in domestic relations disputes.
The use of results obtained also should be rejected because of
the logical inconsistency in acknowledging that the outcome of the
litigation was extremely favorable, at least from a financial stand-
point, but that the party benefited was unable to pay his own at-
torney's fees. This is particularly important because an attorney's
fee award is, at least theoretically, based on a spouse's inability to
pay the attorney's fee incurred. A Wisconsin court 73 noted this
contradiction:
When considering the allowance for attorney's fees, the trial court
stated that it believes that the results were extremely beneficial
for [the wife]. Assuming such to be a fact, and without so decid-
ing, this would not afford a basis for directing an excessive contri-
bution by [the husband] toward [the wife's] attorney's fees. The
converse would be true because it would go directly to the ques-
tion of the [the wife's] need for such assistance.174
Another reason for rejecting results obtained stems from the
unique problem of determining and evaluating "good results." A
upon a matrimonial offense committed by one or both of the parties, is outmoded and irrele-
vant, often producing cruel and unworkable results. The new law substitutes "marital
breakdown" as the only needed justification for divorce. L. WEITZMAN, supra note 88, at 20.
172. Valparaiso Bank & Trust Co. v. Sims, 343 So. 2d 967, 972 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert.
denied, 353 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 1977).
173. Hennen v. Hennen, 193 N.W.2d 717 (Wis. 1972).
174. Id. at 723.
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good result can be fairly identifiable in the context of litigation
involving a violation of antitrust,17 5 securities,17 1 or civil rights 7
laws. The winning party proves that a particular practice is viola-
tive of federal law or policy. In contrast, the good results identified
by courts hearing domestic relations disputes typically involve no
violations of law.17 8 An award of alimony, a property distribution,
or a child custody decision may not as readily be deemed a good
result as would a treble damage award for an antitrust violation.17 9
In awarding an attorney's fee based on the amount involved,
some courts assume that the size of the marital estate bespeaks
litigation complexity and the need for more skilled attorneys. Such
an assumption may be unjustified. In a recent California case, the
community estate was valued at approximately one million dollars,
but the characterization of the property was not an issue and there
was no need to trace the source of funds used to acquire the prop-
erty. 80 The court found that although estate size may be relevant
to the attorney's responsibilities and the parties' ability to pay, it
bears no necessary relationship to the complexity of the
litigation. 18'
There is yet another reason to avoid results obtained in deter-
mining a fee award in domestic relations cases. The prevailing
party in public interest litigation may be viewed as a private attor-
ney general who, in enforcing certain statutes or policies, makes a
significant legal impact extending well beyond the named parties
in the litigation. 8 2 In contrast, domestic relations disputes rarely
involve matters which have great significance to parties other than
the individuals immediately involved. 83
175. See generally Note, Attorneys' Fees in Individual and Class Action Antitrust Liti-
gation, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1656 (1972).
176. E.g., Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980).
177. See Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427 (1973); Newman v. Piggie Park
Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
178. In Welsh v. Welsh, 347 N.E.2d 512 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976), in comparing a domestic
relations dispute with other types of civil litigation, the court emphasized that it was "not
dealing [with] a situation in which the amount of a fund can be used as a helpful guideline
in fixing the amount of fees." Id. at 516.
179. At least one court has characterized the securing of custody over a minor child and
support for the child as a "good" result. See Danache v. Danache, 296 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1956).
180. In re Marriage of Cueva, 149 Cal. Rptr. 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
181. Id. at 922.
182. See generally Zemans, Fee Shifting and the Implementation of Public Policy, 47
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187 (1984); Berger, supra note 12.
183. In commenting on the appropriateness of an attorney's fee award, an Illinois court
noted: "[W]e wish to leave no doubt that the issues presented in this case did involve com-
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The most compelling reason to reject the use of the amount in-
volved and the results obtained in calculating an attorney's fee
award is that by employing this determinate courts are actually
assessing the attorney's fee on a contingency basis. A contingency
agreement is one in which "the attorney for his services in litigat-
ing his client's cause is to have a percentage or portion of the re-
covery . . . in the event of a successful prosecution or defense of
the action. ' 184 Contingency fees in domestic relations cases have
been almost universally condemned. 18
Several reasons have been offered for prohibiting attorneys from
entering into contingency fee contracts with clients in domestic re-
lations matters. Such a contract is thought to promote divorce and
discourage reconciliation of the parties.186 In addition, couples
seeking divorce are often upset and inexperienced in negotiating
contracts, conditions which may lead to "charges of over-reaching
and undue influence. 18 7 Contingency fee contracts are also disap-
proved because they are unnecessary given the statutory mecha-
nism for awarding fees which virtually assures that the needy
spouse will have the means to employ an attorney. 88 Concerns are
also raised that contingency fee contracts can result in a windfall
to the attorney as the services performed may be disproportionate
to the fee received. s'8 Potential for conflict of interest between at-
torney and client'90 and disruption of the schedule "carefully
plex matters of great significance, first and foremost, to the family of the parties . .. .
Bellow v. Bellow, 419 N.E.2d 924 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (emphasis added).
184. 1 S. SPEISER, ATrORNEYS' FEES § 2.1, at 82 (1973). Theoretically, with a "pure" con-
tingency agreement, in the event the lawsuit is unsuccessful, the client refunds all of the
litigation expenses advanced by the attorney. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 123, at 532
n.3. The authors note that as a practical matter, clients seldom repay these expenses if the
matter is unsuccessful.
185. See, e.g., Florida: Hill v. Hill, 415 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1982); Illinois: In re Fisher, 153
N.E.2d 832 (Ill. 1958); Indiana: Barelli v. Levin, 247 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. Ct. App. 1969);
Kansas: Dannenberg v. Dannenberg, 100 P.2d 667 (Kan. 1940); Louisiana: Succession of
Butler, 294 So. 2d 512 (La. 1974); Minnesota: Baskerville v. Baskerville, 75 N.W.2d 762
(Minn. 1956); Mississippi: Avant v. Whitten, 253 So. 2d 394 (Miss. 1971); North Caro-
lina: Thompson v. Thompson, 319 S.E.2d 315 (N.C. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 328
S.E.2d 288 (N.C. 1985).
186. Jordan v. Westerman, 28 N.W. 826 (Mich. 1886); see also Note, Professional Re-
sponsibility-Contingent Fees in Domestic Relations Actions: Equal Freedom to Contract
for the Domestic Bar, 62 N.C.L. REv. 381, 383-84 & n.12 (1984).
187. Barelli v. Levin, 247 N.E.2d 847, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 1969).
188. Thompson v. Thompson, 319 S.E.2d 315 (N.C. App. Ct. 1984), rev'd on other
grounds, 388 S.E.2d 288 (N.C. 1985).
189. See In re Cooper, 344 S.E.2d 27, 31-32 (N.C. App. Ct. 1986).
190. See Martin, Contingency Fees and Family Law, 5 CALIF. LAW. 23, 73 (1985).
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awarded by the court for support or living expenses"1 91 are also
cited as reasons for prohibiting contingency fee contracts in do-
mestic relations cases.
Although the universal condemnation of contingency fee con-
tracts has been recently questioned,192 a change in policy is un-
likely. Accordingly, consistent with the prohibition of such con-
tracts in domestic relations cases, courts should abandon any
determination of a fee award based upon the result achieved by
the attorney.
Many of the criticisms leveled against the contingency fee apply
equally to the current method of awarding a fee based on "amount
involved and the results obtained." If contingency agreements pro-
viding the attorney a percentage of the property distribution or ali-
mony awarded the client are barred because they tend to prevent
reconciliation of the parties, the same is true when the attorney's
compensation is in the form of a fee assessed against the opposing
spouse. The attorney has, it seems, the same incentive to make the
award for the client as lucrative as possible in either instance. The
fear that a contingency agreement may result in a windfall to the
attorney is also equally present in a situation where the attorney
fee award is primarily based on the value of the marital estate.
G. DR 2-106(B)(6)-The Nature and Length of the
Professional Relationship With the Client
As with other factors listed in DR 2-106(B), 19' the specific lan-
guage used in DR 2-106(B)(6) negates any suggestion that it was
intended to be applied in any context other than the traditional
attorney-client relationship. One commentator provides a brief ex-
planation of the relevance of this factor in determining the reason-
able value of attorney's fees: "The amount of the fee to be allowed
may be affected by the question whether the services were per-
formed as an incident of regular or continuing employment or as a
result of a casual hiring.'1 4 Divorce attorneys are seldom retained
on a continuing basis. Client contact is usually limited to the par-
ticular divorce or other familial dispute. However, in the context of
assessing a fee award against an opposing party, the type of em-
191. In re Cooper, 344 S.E.2d 27, 33 (N.C. App. Ct. 1986).
192. See id.; Martin, supra note 190.
193. DR 2-106(5) was implicated in the discussion of DR 2-106(B)(2). See supra text
accompanying notes 142-48. DR 2-106(5) provides for consideration of "the time limitations
imposed by the client or by the circumstances."
194. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 184, § 8.20.
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ployment between attorney and client is irrelevant. Unfortunately,
despite obvious inapplicability to assessment of an attorney's fee
award, this factor has been cited by courts."9 5
H. DR 2-106(B)(7)-The Experience, Reputation, and Ability
of the Lawyer or Lawyers Performing the Services
It is questionable whether this factor adds any additional justifi-
cation for an attorney's fee award not already covered by consider-
ation of the "skill requisite to perform the legal service properly,"
which is included in DR 2-106(B)(1). In many cases, the factor is
merely repeated with the other guidelines contained in DR 2-
106(B) without comment."9 " On those occasions when courts have
paused to comment on the experience, reputation, standing, or
abilities of the lawyers performing the service, their comments
have been so uniformly favorable that it appears every attorney in
a fee award dispute is a distinguished member of the bar. 9 '
L DR 2-106(B) (8)-Whether the Fee Is Fixed or Contingent
This factor is applied to increase an attorney's fee award in situ-
ations where he has successfully prosecuted a claim for relief and
where he would otherwise expect little, if any, compensation. It has
been held that "a contingent fee should be substantially higher
than a fixed fee because of the possibility that counsel, expending
great time and effort, may recover nothing."" 8 In domestic rela-
tions practice, few matters present the problem of the attorney ex-
pending a great deal of time and effort with the possibility of re-
covering no fee at all. Unlike personal injury claims or similar
actions, attorneys practicing in the domestic relations area will ex-
195. See, e.g., In re Lockyear, 305 N.E.2d 440 (Ind. 1974).
196. See, e.g., Alabama: Burgess v. Burgess, 309 So. 2d 107 (Ala. Civ. App. 1974), writ
denied, 309 So. 2d 111 (Ala. 1975); Illinois: Christian v. Christian, 387 N.E.2d 1254 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979); Nebraska: Bowman v. Bowman, 79 N.W.2d 554 (Neb. 1956) (proceeding
for modification of support award); Oregon: Colbath v. Colbath, 516 P.2d 763 (Or. App.
1973).
197. See, e.g., Alabama: Burgess v. Burgess, 309 So. 2d 107, 110 (Ala. Civ. App. 1974),
writ denied, 309 So. 2d 111 (Ala. 1975) ("counsel were well-respected members of the Bir-
mingham Bar, imminently qualified to represent appellee's interest"); Illinois: Bellow v.
Bellow, 419 N.E.2d 924, 935 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (counsel "embodied the best of skills and
professionalism"); South Carolina: Collins v. Collins, 122 S.E.2d 1 (S.C. 1961) ("[clounsel
for all parties in the case at bar are well known to this court as gentlemen of the highest
professional standing").
198. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 184, § 8.10; see also 2 M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, COURT
AwARDED ATTORNEY FEES § 15.02, at 15-24 to 15-25 (1985).
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pect and receive compensation from either the client or the client's
adversary or both. This factor, accordingly, has little relevance to
an attorney's fee award in domestic relations cases. Despite the
clear intention that it serve as a guide in determining fees in a
different catagory of cases, the factor has been cited as deserving
of consideration in the determination of fees in domestic relations
litigation. eg
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 00 and many state stat-
utes provide for the award of fees but supply little guidance to aid
the court in determining when a fee award is appropriate.20 One
solution is for each party to pay his own fees. Under common law
the wife was awarded suit money and attorney's fees as a matter of
necessity. In an era of equal employment opportunities the theo-
retical justification for providing assistance is no longer present.
Available statistical evidence suggests, however, that great eco-
nomic disparity still exists between husbands and wives and thus
their corresponding financial abilities to employ attorneys to main-
tain or defend actions.0 2 Given this reality, it would be patently
unfair to suggest that every litigant should pay his own attorney's
fees.
One solution to the problem of providing attorney's fees to
spouses for the prosecution or defense of domestic relations cases
is for both parties to bear the costs. The total attorney's fees for
the parties' attorneys would be determined either by stipulation of
199. See, e.g., Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980), where the court states:
The choice of a lawyer, and the value of his services, may depend upon a number
of factors, including his background of learning and experience, his ability, his
integrity and his dedication to the causes with which he identifies himself. Also to
be considered is the reputation he has acquired, the nature and importance of the
matter, and the amount of money or value of property involved. There is also the
matter as to how the lawyer is to be paid: cash in advance, extended credit,
whether a fixed amount, or contingent on success, or other conditions.
Id. at 1385.
200. See supra note 7.
201. The Illinois statutory provision for awarding attorney's fees demonstrates the lack
of statutory direction. The statute provides:
The court from time to time, after due notice and hearing, and after considering
the financial resources of the parties, may order either spouse to pay a reasonable
amount for his own costs and attorney's fees and for the costs and attorney's fees
necessarily incurred by the other spouse ..
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, 508(a) (1985).
202. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation and Women Workers, 6
WOMENS RTS. L. REP. 19, 22 n.7 (1980).
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the parties203 or by the court. The amount would then be deducted
from the marital estate prior to any allocations for alimony, main-
tenance, child support, or property distribution.04
The current statutory provisions authorizing an award of attor-
ney's fees provide only two options to the court. The court may
hold that both parties are to be responsible for their own fees, or it
may decide that the fees of one spouse are to be paid by the other.
The suggestion offered here would provide the court and the par-
ties with a third option and could be accomplished with only a
slight modification in present statutory provisions. So modified,
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act might provide:
The court from time to time, after considering the financial re-
sources of both parties, may order a party to pay a reasonable
amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defend-
ing any proceeding under this Act and for attorney's fees includ-
ing sums for legal services rendered and costs incurred prior to
the commencement of the proceeding or after entry of judgment
or may provide that both parties will be responsible for the com-
bined total of such fees with costs to be deducted from the mari-
tal estate.
This alternative solution for assessing attorney's fees could elim-
inate several of the problems associated with the present fee-shift-
ing policy. First, it would eliminate the bitter disputes caused by
the imposition of fee awards against a single party. Because both
parties would be paying the costs of the entire litigation, the com-
bined charges for attorneys' fees could be viewed in much the same
way as the parties view a lien on marital property which is to be
divided after full payment of the lien. If, for instance, the marital
residence is to be sold and the proceeds divided evenly, under nor-
mal circumstances proceeds refers to the net amount received after
payment of the mortgage, broker's commission, taxes, closing costs,
and other items associated with disposal of the asset. The same
principle could apply to a combined payment for attorneys' fees in
203. A stipulation as to the amount of both parties' attorney's fees has been approved
and utilized by at least one court. See Schmidt v. Schmidt, 162 N.W.2d 618 (Wis. 1968).
204. One obvious problem with this solution is that there may be insufficient liquid as-
sets available for payment of the agreed upon fees. On the other hand, the lack of liquid
assets from which to satisfy creditors or the other spouse is commonplace. Frequently, a
spouse's one-half share of the marital home can be realized only after the emancipation of
all minor children and then sale of the home. There is no theoretical reason why attorney's
fees could not be similarly treated.
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that all assets could be distributed or allocated after the costs, in-
cluding attorneys' fees, accountants' fees, transcripts, and discov-
ery costs, are deducted.
The suggested alternative also would eliminate the need for the
court to contrive reasons to compensate a spouse with substan-
tially less earning power than the other spouse. The relative wealth
and earning power of the couple would be considered rather than
the wealth and earning power of the individuals who now bear the
burden of the fee awards.
A related advantage is that it may diminish the resentment gen-
erated in a system which often makes one party the big "winner"
and the other the big "loser" in a protracted domestic relations
battle. Though it is not suggested that the attorneys' fees will be
less than the fees being awarded or paid under the present system,
if the fees are deducted according to the policy outlined above,
both parties may feel they are "losers" in the litigation. Thus, if
both spouses are cognizant that their protracted legal battles have
the effect of reducing the funds ultimately available for distribu-
tion, this might shorten considerably the litigation process and
promote negotiated settlements.
There is a third advantage to a combined attorney's fee award. A
court, using the suggested procedure, could award the maximum
fees to be charged to either party. Private retainer agreements
which provide for any amounts in addition to that awarded by the
court would be prohibited. 08 Under the present system, fee awards
are often made without regard to whether the client has made pre-
vious payments to the attorney receiving the award or whether an
independent agreement binds the client to a payment in excess of
the amount awarded by the court. Under the suggested system, all
fee arrangements would be disclosed and prior payments credited.
Under this procedure, the court and the paying spouse will have
full confidence that carefully designed calculations for support of a
spouse or dependent children will not be negated by distributions
paid to legal counsel.
205. The suggestion that a court can alter the fee agreement between a client and his
attorney is not new or novel. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Moriber, 314 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1975); In
re Marriage of Coltman, 500 N.E.2d 506 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); In re Marriage of Angiuli, 480
N.E.2d 513 (I1. App. Ct. 1985).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The easiest method for calculating an attorney's fee would be for
the parties to stipulate to the amount. If agreement cannot be
reached, however, an alternative would be for the court to award
attorneys' fees based on the English system of standardized fees
for certain functions performed. Though the domestic relations bar
may complain that marital dissolution litigation must be tailor-
made, certain routine actions are performed20 6 regardless of estate
size or the unique circumstances.
Just as many worker's compensation statutes contain specific
provisions with respect to attorney's fees for services on behalf of a
client in those proceedings, similar standardization can be accom-
plished in the domestic relations field. °7 Despite early opposition,
the modern trend is toward setting of child support payments
based upon a schedule provided by the court.20 8 Use of the sched-
ules does not preclude the court from awarding more than the sug-
gested amount of support and there is no reason to suggest the
same would not be true with a schedule for attorney's fees.
The present system for determining when an attorney's fee
award will be made in a domestic relations case undermines the
confidence of the public. Additionally, use of DR 2-106(B) in de-
termining the reasonable value of the attorney's services is often
confusing and illogical. The same laudable goals which served as
the impetus for the adoption of the concept of no-fault divorce
should be applied to produce a system of no-fault attorneys' fee
awards.
Justice should be administered economically, efficiently, and ex-
peditiously. The attorney's fee is, therefore, a very important fac-
tor in the administration of justice, and if it is not determined
with proper relation to that fact it results in a species of social
206. Routine actions would include drafting and filing a petition for dissolution or draft-
ing a reply to such a petition. In cases where additional pleadings are required, additional
fees would be justified.
207. Standardized fees would not necessarily mean identical fees. The domestic relations
bar might be persuaded to accept this proposal if a sliding scale were used in the assessment
of fees.
208. The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 require each state to estab-
lish guidelines for child support amounts. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-378, § 18(a), 98 Stat. 1305 (1984) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 666
(Supp. III 1985). See generally Bruch, Developing Standards for Child Support Payments:
A Critique of Current Practice, 16 U.C.D. L. REv. 49 (1982).
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malpractice that undermines the confidence of the public in the
bench and bar."'
209. Baruch v. Giblin, 164 So. 831 (Fla. 1935) (emphasis supplied).

